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Abstract
The doctoral thesis ‘Impact of regulatory measures on international trade in meat 
products’ analyzes the differing effects of various regulatory measures on 
international meat trade and on welfare using different quantitative economic
models. Regulatory measures are defined as instruments correcting for market 
inefficiencies which are associated with production, distribution and consumption 
of agri-food products.
The impact of regulatory measures on trade and welfare is assumed to be non-
uniform: Regulations may have negative, no, or even positive trade and welfare 
effects. Therefore, the impacts of different specific regulatory measures are
systematically compared with each other in two case studies. The applied 
quantitative models and their implementation are theoretically as well as
economically derived and possible alternatives are discussed.
Employing a non-linear gravity model with fixed effects being estimated by 
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood, the differing quantitative effects of applied 
regulatory measures that govern international trade in meat are analyzed in the first 
case study. Additionally, regulations are identified which most adequately conform
to the trade restrictiveness provisions of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement 
and the Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement. Especially production process 
requirements and requirements for handling meat after slaughtering are identified 
to be trade restrictive, whereas other analyzed requirements are even trade 
promoting.
Using a sample selection seemingly unrelated regression gravity model and a 
spatial Takayama-Judge partial equilibrium model, the second case study analyzes
a change in a specific regulation related to biohazards to identify trade and welfare 
changes of different policy options. Poultry meat and avian influenza-related 
regulatory measures are used as examples. Spread and transmission risks according 
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to the disease status of countries are considered. The econometric model shows that 
for non-heat-treated poultry meat a general ban leads to a near breakdown of trade, 
whereas complying with the principle of regionalization has a clear positive trade 
impact in comparison to a situation without any regulatory policy. For heat-treated 
poultry meat these plausible outcomes could not be replicated. The simulation
model results confirm the negative welfare impact of currently implemented 
regulatory policies and indicate that significant trade reorganization occurs.
The thesis ends with a summary of the major findings and gives
recommendations for further research. It surely advances existing literature in 
comparing systematically and quantitatively the trade and welfare effects of 
different regulatory measures, but it fails in giving standardized advice to policy 
makers how to generally identify the optimal regulatory solutions.
Keywords: Non-tariff measures, trade economics, gravity model, spatial partial 
equilibrium model, meat, poultry meat, avian influenza.
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Kurzfassung
Die Dissertation ‚Einfluss von regulatorischen Maßnahmen auf den internationalen 
Handel mit Fleischprodukten‘ untersucht unter Zuhilfenahme quantitativer
ökonomischer Modelle die Auswirkungen verschiedener regulatorischer
Maßnahmen auf den internationalen Fleischhandel und auf die Wohlfahrt. Dabei 
werden regulatorische Maßnahmen als Instrumente zur Korrektur von
Marktineffizienzen verstanden, die mit Produktion, Verteilung und Konsum von 
Agrarprodukten in Verbindung stehen. 
Die Auswirkungen regulatorischer Maßnahmen auf Handel und Wohlfahrt
können nicht als gleichgerichtet angenommen werden: Maßnahmen können 
negative, keine oder sogar positive Handels- und Wohlfahrtseffekte zur Folge 
haben. Deshalb werden in zwei Fallstudien die Effekte verschiedener spezifischer 
regulatorischer Maßnahmen systematisch miteinander verglichen. Die verwendeten 
quantitativen Modelle und ihre praktische Ausführung werden theoretisch und 
ökonomisch hergeleitet und mögliche Alternativen diskutiert.
In der ersten Fallstudie wird ein nicht-lineares Fixed-Effects Gravitätsmodell 
mittels Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood geschätzt. Dabei werden die sich 
voneinander unterscheidenden quantitativen Handelswirkungen verwendeter 
Maßnahmen zur Regulierung des internationalen Fleischhandels ermittelt.
Darüberhinaus werden solche Maßnahmen identifiziert, die den Vorgaben des
Abkommens über sanitäre und phytosanitäre Maßnahmen sowie des 
Übereinkommens über technische Handelshemmnisse hinsichtlich 
handelsverzerrender Auswirkungen am besten entsprechen. Besonders 
Bestimmungen über Produktionsprozesse und Bestimmungen über den Umgang 
mit Fleisch nach der Schlachtung werden als handelsverzerrend identifiziert, 
wohingegen andere untersuchte Maßnahmen den Handel sogar anregen.
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In einer zweiten Fallstudie werden die Auswirkungen verschiedener regulatorischer 
Politiken auf Handel und Wohlfahrt mittels eines Sample Selection Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression Gravitätsmodells und eines räumlichen und partiellen 
Takayama-Judge Gleichgewichtsmodells aufgezeigt. Geflügelfleisch und 
Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung der Ausbreitung von Vogelgrippe dienen als 
Besispiel, wobei das Risiko der Ausbreitung und der Übertragung von Vogelgrippe 
berücksichtigt wird. Die ökonometrische Analyse verdeutlicht, dass ein 
allgemeines Einfuhrverbot für nicht-hitzebehandeltes Geflügelfleisch den Handel 
mit diesem Produkt quasi zum Erliegen bringt, wohingegen die Anwendung des 
Prinzips der Regionalisierung deutlich handelssteigernd wirkt. Diese eingängigen
Ergebnisse können für hitzebehandeltes Geflügelfleisch nicht bestätigt werden. Die 
Ergebnisse des Simulationsmodells bekräftigen die negativen 
Wohlfahrtswirkungen der zurzeit geltenden regulatorischen Instrumente, und 
machen deutlich, dass Handelsströme in Abhängigkeit vom jeweiligen 
Seuchenstatus der betrachteten Länder umgeleitet werden.
Abschließend werden die wichtigsten Erkenntnisse der Arbeit zusammengefasst 
und Vorschläge für weitergehende Untersuchungen gegeben. Die Dissertation geht 
klar über vorhandene Literatur hinaus, da in ihr erstmals Handels- und 
Wohlfahrtseffekte verschiedener regulatorischer Maßnahmen systematisch und 
quantitativ miteinander verglichen werden. Sie erreicht allerdings nicht das Ziel, 
politischen Entscheidungsträgern standardisierte Handlungsempfehlungen 
anzubieten, wie generell die besten regulatorischen Lösungen gefunden werden 
können.
Stichwörter: Nicht-tarifäre Handelsmaßnahmen, Handelsökonomik, Gravitäts-
modell, räumliches partielles Gleichgewichtsmodell, Fleisch, Geflügelfleisch, 
Vogelgrippe.
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General introduction
1
1 General introduction 
The steady decline of tariff rates as a result of eight multilateral trade negotiation
rounds, and multiple regional, bilateral and unilateral tariff liberalization 
agreements have increased the relative importance of non-tariff measures (NTMs) 
such as regulations and standards in the international trade regime.1 NTMs are 
defined by the multi-agency support team as policy measures other than customs 
tariffs that can potentially have an economic effect on international trade in goods 
and services, changing quantities traded, prices, or both (MAST 2008). The thesis’ 
focal point is on an important subset of NTMs which are governmental regulations. 
Regulations can be understood as instruments correcting for market imperfections 
and inefficiencies which are associated with production, distribution and 
consumption of agri-food products. International meat markets are especially 
affected by those regulations, as trade in meat products is exposed to a wide 
number of market failures. Diseases, pandemics and meat and feed scandals in the 
last decade have increased consumers’ and producers’ awareness of external effects 
associated with trade in meat products. Therefore the product focus of the 
quantitative analyses within this thesis is on meat.
Governmental regulations are set within the frame of the regulatory system for 
agri-food products, and thus they are first of all domestic affairs. These domestic 
requirements determine which characteristics foreign as well as domestic products 
have to possess in order to be sold on the domestic market. The chosen national 
regulations often reflect national peculiarities such as institutional structures, 
technical and scientific resources, natural conditions, as well as consumption 
traditions such as consumer preferences and acceptable levels of food safety risks. 
However, international coordination is required for World Trade Organization 
(WTO) member countries and is necessary for a functioning international trade in 
1 Within this thesis the notions regulations/regulatory measures/regulatory instruments are policy 
measures being defined and implemented by public authorities; they are used as synonyms. In 
contrast, standards are regulatory systems provided by private actors within the market chain.
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meat products. At the international level, the relation between domestic regulations 
and international requirements is organized by the WTO trade rules in the Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement and in the Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade (TBT). The SPS and TBT Agreements apply to regulations on a product 
level, but production and process requirements also fall under these agreements if 
they are product-related, i.e. if the choice of the production method physically 
impacts the final product. The provisions under the SPS and TBT Agreement aim 
to ensure that regulations are not misued as disguised protectionist measures. 
Requirements for foreign products are not allowed to be more stringent than those 
for domestic ones and foreign products should generally be treated like 
corresponding domestic ones. The SPS Agreement, however, foresees the 
possibility of divergent rules for foreign food products if they impact human, 
animal and/or plant health and life in the importing country. The TBT Agreement 
includes similar provisions to meet legitimate national objectives, including 
security, human health and safety and the prevention of deceptive practices. In 
order to impose different and possibly tighter regulatory measures on foreign 
products, importing countries are required to provide scientific risk assessment, 
thereby justifying the necessity of the respective requirements.2 Additionally, 
requirements have to be commensurate with regard to their objective and have to 
be least trade restrictive with regard to achieving their objective. While maintaining 
the sovereign right of countries to set their own governmental regulations, 
countries are encouraged to base their import requirements on internationally 
agreed regulations such as those from the Codex Alimentarius, the World 
Organisation for Animal Health or the International Plant Protection Convention.3
2 Annex IV of the SPS Agreement defines the scientific risk assessment procedure.
3 The provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) govern the relation between 
domestic and foreign products, too. The principles of most-favored-nation treatment (GATT Article 
1) and national treatment (GATT Article 3) command that ‘like products’ must not be treated 
differently neither when comparing imports originating from different countries nor when comparing 
imports with domestic products. A product is ‘like’ if it is not physical and detectable distinguishable 
from the comparative product.
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Regulatory measures impact trade. It can be thought of many possible situations 
where regulations increase, decrease or leave trade unaltered. 
First, regulations can cause costs, thus affecting supply and demand. 
Requirements demanded by importing countries cause compliance costs for 
exporters. Therefore, the exporters’ comparative advantage in trade can be 
undermined. Compliance costs may arise because producers have to change their 
production processes in order to satisfy the requirements of the foreign market’s 
regulations. In addition, country and sector specific factors, for example 
infrastructure, administrative services as well as market structure, influence
compliance costs, and thus the magnitude of the regulations’ impact. In the applied 
analysis of simulation models, the cost-causing impact of NTMs is depicted as 
tariff equivalent (Yue and Beghin 2009, Yue et al. 2006) or iceberg tariff 
(Krugman 1991, Samuelson 1952). When analyzing NTMs related to the protection 
of agri-food production from biohazards the risk-based approach has a long history 
in the literature. Pioneering research by Paarlberg and Lee (1998) was amplified 
through spatial coverage (Jansson et al. 2005), linkages to dynamic herd-size 
models (Niemi and Lehtonen 2011, Nogueira et al. 2011, Mangen and Burrell
2003), and richness in model and disease parameter specification (Peterson and
Orden 2008, Wilson and Antón 2006, Yue et al. 2006). The demand curve may 
also shift in response to the introduction of regulatory measures (Polinsky and 
Rogerson 1983). If consumers are aware of a specific product characteristic 
regulated by a certain measure and they consider the product characteristic as poor 
for their utility, they will negatively internalize the expected damage linked to the 
characteristic in their consumption. Then consumers take over their own losses 
causing the demand curve to shift down by the consumers’ perceived losses.
Second, regulations bring about benefits for both consumers and producers
affecting demand and supply. Regulations may expand demand for a good through 
better information about the product or by enhancing the product’s attributes 
General introduction
4
(Maertens and Swinnen 2009, Maertens et al. 2007, Polinsky and Rogerson 1983).4
That means regulations produce trust between buyers and sellers; they transport the 
necessary information without which trade would not take place at all. Moreover, 
regulations are beneficial for consumers due to an increase in safety or quality of 
agri-food products, or for producers due to e.g. the prevention of a dispersion of 
animal or plant pests and diseases. Such consumer-producer benefits can be 
depicted by shifting demand and supply curves in simulation models (Beghin and 
Bureau 2001), which may offset corresponding demand and supply shifts in the 
other direction, thereby leading to a win-win situation for producers or exporters 
and consumers.
Having this in mind, the trade and welfare effect of regulatory measures is 
hence first and foremost an empirical question, and econometric estimation of 
gravity-type models as well as different types of simulation models have 
commonly been used in the literature to quantify the trade and welfare effects.
1.1 Problem statement and research objective
The existence of a multitude of different regulatory measures enables policy 
makers to make a selection and choose those measures that seem appropriate to 
achieve their desired predefined policy goals. The provisions of the SPS 
Agreement require that regulations targeting specific national agri-food safety 
objectives are minimal with respect to their trade effects (Article 5.4) and not more 
trade restrictive than required (Article 5.6). These provisions are aimed at reducing 
the trade costs associated with the implementation of the regulations and 
simultaneously maintain a desired national agri-food safety and quality level. The 
trade and welfare effects of the different possibly appropriate regulatory measures 
differ, and it is not well understood which measures are minimal with respect to 
their trade effects and consequently not more trade restrictive than required. Even 
4 Beghin et al. (2009) provide information on recent methods determining the consumers’ willingness 
to pay and how to appropriately depict the consumers’ behavior in face of regulatory measures.
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more, the desired policy goals are not necessarily only formulated in consideration 
of the provisions of multilateral trade rules, leaving an opportunity for policy 
makers to select a regulatory measure that may follow other objectives keeping 
away foreign competition.
The objective of this thesis is first, to show that the trade effects of different 
existing regulatory measures governing trade in meat can differ considerably, being 
negative, not measurable, or even positive. The different measures’ trade effects 
are quantified via case study work on meat products defined in the Harmonized 
System (HS) 02 code at a 4-digit level using a broad set of different regulatory 
measures and different policy goals. The selection of the appropriate measures 
determines the trade restrictiveness of the implementation of the desired policy 
goal. 
A second objective is to analyze trade and country welfare effects of changes in 
importers’ regulatory policies using as an example the poultry meat sector which 
was heavily influenzed by the avian influenza (AI) disease in the last decade. 
Poultry meat is split into uncooked meat which is defined as the HS code 0207 and 
cooked meat which is defined as the aggregate of the HS codes 160231, 160232, 
and 160239. This breakdown is made because the risk or threat associated with the 
prevalence of AI differs between both product categories. The trade and welfare 
effects of two different policy scenarios are quantitatively compared. Poultry meat 
is chosen because it is the fastest growing meat product in terms of global 
production in the last decade, but simultaneously its trade is regulated intensively 
due to the prevalence of the AI disease.
1.2 Methodological background
This thesis applies two methods – econometric and simulation modeling - for 
quantitatively determining the impact of governmental regulations on trade and 
welfare.
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For quantifying the impact of regulatory measures on meat and poultry meat trade 
an econometric model is estimated which basically describes bilateral trade flows 
by a function of exporter and importer gross domestic product (GDP) and trade 
costs such as geographic distance and regulations. The application of this so-called 
gravity model goes back to Tinbergen (1962). He first employed the concept of the 
gravitational force to explain the volume of international trade. Different 
econometric techniques have been applied in the literature to estimate the gravity 
model, and advantages and drawbacks of the most relevant techniques are 
discussed. The first case study of this thesis employs a non-linear panel data 
gravity model which is estimated by fixed effects Poisson pseudo-maximum 
likelihood (PPML) in order to estimate the magnitude of different regulatory 
measures on meat trade. In a second case study a sample selection model based on 
Heckman (1979) and Helpman et al. (2008) is developed to receive coefficients 
measuring the impact of AI-related policy measures on bilateral poultry meat trade 
flows. In a first step, a Probit model is estimated by seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) maximum likelihood (ML). In a second step, the conditional expected trade 
flow given that the trade observation is positive is estimated by non-linear least 
squares (NLS).
For quantifying the welfare effect of AI-related policy variations a spatial 
partial equilibrium model is developed in the second case study that is based on a 
Takayama-Judge-type design (Takayama and Judge 1971). It contains a risk 
dimension to separate the policy variation impact from other effects and to 
calculate the policy measures’ impact on welfare. The Takayama-Judge model
goes back to Enke (1951), Samuelson (1952) and Takayama and Judge (1964) and 
reproduces the equilibrium prices and trade flows of spatially separated markets. 
The spatial price equilibrium renders prices, trade flows and quantities supplied 
and demanded. They satisfy the equilibrium condition of equalizing prices in the 
importing country with those in the exporting country plus transport costs, 
including costs associated with adhering to import requirements. 
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1.3 Structure of the thesis
The core of the thesis consists out of two case studies. Each case study is preluded 
by a chapter discussing in detail theory and methodology used in the case studies.
Chapter 2 deals with theory and quantitative methods available to determine the 
impact of regulatory measures on trade and gives first reasons for the choice of the 
different applications of the gravity model in the two case studies. Section 2.1 
provides a general overview on deriving the gravity model theoretically on a sound 
economic base. Section 2.2 discusses different econometric applications of the 
theoretically derived trade models. It provides available results on estimated 
impacts of border barriers in general and technical regulations in particular on 
(agri-food) trade. Section 2.3 highlights the findings of the chapter.
Chapter 3 describes the first case study. Given that only limited knowledge 
exists on specific trade impacts of different regulatory measures and given that 
policy makers have a wide range of different policy measures available to enforce 
their desired policy goals especially in the meat sector, this case study analyzes the 
trade impact of different regulatory measures imposed to achieve a desired level of 
sanitary health and quantifies different implied trade effects. In addition, the case 
study identifies those sanitary measures that most adequately conform to Articles
5.4 and 5.6 of the SPS Agreement, differentiated by classes of regulations and 
policy objectives. The choice of the econometric approach used to estimate the 
gravity model is discussed in section 3.1. In section 3.2 the case study contains the 
results of an extensive search and gathering of information on regulatory sanitary 
measures in the meat sector. 29 specific regulatory instruments are identified and 
rearranged into six classes which describe different agri-food safety purposes. The 
regulatory instruments are additionally assigned to one or more of four different 
policy goals that are part of the mandatory national WTO notifications. Section 3.3
presents the results of the analysis and different specification tests, before section 
3.4 concludes.
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Chapter 4 discusses theory and quantitative methods available to determine welfare 
impacts of NTMs. Two different types of simulation models are contrasted with 
each other in section 4.1 - the Takayama-Judge model and the Armington model. 
Section 4.2 discusses how to include regulatory measures and their associated costs 
and benefits into a Takayama-Judge-type partial equilibrium model, looking on the 
supply as well as on the demand side. Section 4.3 discusses the findings of this 
chapter.
Chapter 5 contains the second case study of this thesis. Given the growing 
importance of trade in poultry meat, many countries implement drastic measures to 
restrict poultry meat trade associated with a perceived or actual risk of transferring 
AI into their territory. The case study therefore aims at analyzing the impact of 
avian influenza-related policy measures on trade with poultry meat and the 
importers’ and exporters’ welfare by using an econometric and a simulation model. 
The econometric model evaluates AI-related policies in terms of their trade impact, 
differentiating between cooked and uncooked poultry meat, as policy makers 
differentiate between both product categories. Furthermore, feasible future policies 
are evaluated ex ante using a partial equilibrium model. The welfare changes due to 
variations in the importers’ AI-related regulatory policies are analyzed, considering 
transmission risks according to the disease status of the considered countries.
Section 5.1 describes the methodology of the gravity and the partial equilibrium 
model and explains the data used. Results of both models are presented and
discussed in section 5.2. Section 5.3 concludes.
In chapter 6 the thesis presents a summary of the results and discusses 
limitations of the work. Finally, concluding remarks are drawn from the analysis.
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2 Determining the trade impact of regulatory 
measures
It can be thought of many possible situations where import requirements can 
increase trade, decrease it or leave it unaltered.5 The trade effect of regulatory 
measures is therefore a priori unclear. This makes the question about how these 
measures affect trade flows first and foremost an empirical one. The following 
chapter concentrates on analytical methods quantifying the impact of regulatory 
instruments on countries’ trade flows and motivates the choice of the methods used 
in the analytical case studies of this thesis presented in chapters 3 and 5.
For quantitatively determining the trade impact of regulatory measures a 
specific form of an econometric model is applied most often in the literature which 
is called gravity model. 6 It describes bilateral trade flows by a function of exporter 
and importer GDP and world GDP (Deardorff 1998). Gravity models are quantity-
based econometric models. Contrary to simulation models which utilize price terms 
directly, gravity models include price terms only implicitly via a function of 
observable and unobservable variables. Insofar gravity models do not allow for
welfare economics, but the estimated trade flow impact can be transformed into 
price effects via marginal effects and elasticities to obtain tariff equivalents.
Under the assumption of trade frictions the assessment of impacts of any form 
of tariff or non-tariff measures is allowed, including regulatory measures, by the 
integration of different relevant variables potentially leading to “distance” between 
countries. In generally, gravity models ask for the impact of NTMs on (bilateral) 
trade flows. They consider the foregone trade that cannot be explained by tariffs 
and other potential explanatory variables. As such they do not only consider the 
trade volume per exporter, but can also take into account the number of trade 
5 This chapter is based on the two papers Schlueter (2008) and Demaria et al. (2011).
6 The literature of applied economics discusses several methods of quantifying non-tariff trade 
measures: See Cipollina and Salvatici (2008), Ferrantino (2006), Bora et al. (2002), Beghin and 
Bureau (2001), Deardorff and Stern (1997).
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relationships. This is of major importance as many potential trade relationships do 
not come about on a product-specific level, thus trade flows are zero. 
The application of gravity models goes back to Tinbergen (1962) who 
employed the gravitational force concept to explain the volume of international 
trade. In his econometric analyses he shows that trade is determined by the 
economic size of trading partners as well as by their geographic distance. Anderson 
(1979) first presents a theoretical foundation for the gravity model. It is based on 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences with goods being 
differentiated by their origin. Subsequent extensions of economic gravity model 
theory have added Heckscher-Ohlin structures (Deardorff 1998, Dornbusch et al. 
1980), monopolistic competition (Redding and Venables 2004, Bergstrand 1989, 
Helpman 1987), or Ricardian elements (Eaton and Kortum 2002).
Usually, gravity models are specified in a straightforward log-normal equation
that is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). However, there are considerable 
problems associated with this specification and its estimation, as depending on the 
structure of the data the estimates might be biased and inefficient. First, trade is 
determined by relative trade barriers. Omitting unobserved country-pair 
heterogeneity such as multilateral resistance may cause biased estimates (Baldwin 
and Taglioni 2006, Anderson and van Wincoop 2003). Second, many potential 
trade relationships on a product-specific level do not exist. Standard sample 
selection bias may result from the need to drop the observations with zero trade 
flows when log-linearizing the gravity equation (Helpman et al. 2008, Silva and 
Tenreyro 2006). Third, potential unobserved firm level heterogeneity caused by an 
omitted variable which measures the impact of the number of exporting firms may 
produce biased estimates, i.e. the intensive (trade volume per exporter) and 
extensive margin (number of trade relationships) of the trade impact of trade 
frictions has to be taken into account (Silva and Tenreyro 2008, Helpman et al. 
2008). And fourth, the assumption of homoscedasticity of the errors is questionable 
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resulting in inefficient estimates (Martin and Pham 2008, Silva and Tenreyro 
2006).7
This chapter first provides an overview on the literature presenting different 
theoretical derivations of the gravity model, and second summarizes recent 
literature on different estimation techniques that go beyond the log-normal gravity 
model specification and thus account for some or all of the aforementioned 
problems. The last section concludes.
2.1 Economic specification of the gravity model
The gravity model can be given a structural interpretation from a wide range of 
trade theories. This chapter reviews main developments in the theoretical 
specification of gravity models. Consider a frictionless trade equilibrium, where 
each country is a net exporter of some products to the world market and a net 
importer of others, prices for goods are the same for all consumers, and consumers
are indifferent with regard to the products’ origins. These assumptions are 
sufficient to develop a model which falls automatically in the simple gravity 
structure
i j
ij w
YY
M
Y
= (1)
as shown by Deardorff (1998) and Bergstrand (1989), where ijM presents the trade 
value from exporting country to importing country , is exporter GDP, 
is importer GDP and presents world GDP. The gravity model can be given a 
structural interpretation from a wide range of trade theories. This section reviews 
main developments in specifying gravity models theoretically. 
7 Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) summarize various canonical challenges in the gravity literature.
i j iY jY
wY
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Gravity in Heckscher-Ohlin trade models
Deardorff (1998) extends the simple gravity equation by motivating it in the 
context of the HO trade theory assuming first frictionless trade, i.e. 
net trade gross trade≤ as consumers are indifferent among all equally priced 
sources of supply. Second, he assumes trade restrictions; then factor prices cannot 
be equal across any two countries that trade with each other as prices of goods 
must differ between those countries to overcome the positive trade costs. 
Production lies outside the factor price equalization set when large differences in 
factor endowments across countries exist. As a result product specialization arises
(Feenstra 2004, Dornbusch et al. 1980).8 Deardoff (1998) employs a utility 
maximizing model, first with Cobb-Douglas preferences, then with constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) preferences. As before, competition is assumed to 
be perfect. Cobb-Douglas preferences imply that identical fractions of income in 
each importing country j are spent on the product of country i , as the demand 
elasticities of utility for consuming the products of the exporting countries equal 
the expenditure shares of the importing countries. With Cobb-Douglas preferences,
Deardoff (1998) derives again the simple gravity equation i jcifij w
YY
M
Y
= , where 
cif
ijM is the trade flow valued by c.i.f. prices
9, and 
1i jfob
ij w
ij
YY
M
Y t
= , where fobijM
represents the trade flow valued by f.o.b. prices10, and ijt represents trading costs 
including transport costs, tariffs and costs caused by NTMs. F.o.b prices equal c.i.f 
prices minus the costs for transportation and insurance between exporting and 
8 Evenett and Keller (2002) criticize that the HO model predicts perfect product specialization in 
different countries only for large differences in product endowments. In contrast, increasing returns to 
scale models do not need the assumption of differences in factor proportions to derive perfect 
specialization.
9 The c.i.f. price is the price of a good delivered at the frontier of the importing country including the 
costs of the good, insurance and freight.
10 The f.o.b. price is the price of a good at the customs frontier of the country from which it is 
exported and means ‘free on board price’.
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importing countries’ borders. Deardorff (1998) argues that even though the trade 
value with f.o.b prices declines with increasing transport costs, bilateral 
expenditures on international trade do not go down with higher trade costs when 
assuming Cobb-Douglas preferences. In contrast, deploying homothetic CES 
preferences yields a gravity structure which ensures that increasing bilateral 
distance between trading partners reduces trade expenditures. Homotheticity 
provides for ratios of demanded goods depending on relative prices only, and not 
on consumers’ income. Bilateral trade then equals the simple gravity equation 
multiplied by an expression called remoteness term. In its simplest form, 
remoteness can be understood as income weighted distance from all other 
countries, divided by world income (Coe et al. 2007, Wei 1996). Deardorff’s 
(1998) remoteness index is a ratio of the relative distance between exporting 
country i and importing country j and the average of all importers’ relative 
distances from exporter i : 
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ij
i ij
i
j
ij
j
j
i ij
i
t
t
R
t
t
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
σ
α
θ
α
−
 
 − −
−
 
 − −
 
 
 
 
  
     =
 
 
 
 
  
     
∑
∑
∑
, (2)
where the numerator is country ’s relative distance from country , and the 
denominator is the average of all importers’ relative distances to exporting country 
. Parameter is the elasticity of substitution between all goods with ; the 
closer substitutes countries’ goods are to each other, the higher is the elasticity, and 
the greater is the extent to which bilateral trade flows are constrained by trade 
j i
i σ 1σ ≥
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costs. Parameter represents the share of income consumers in each country 
spent on goods from country , and .ij w
Y
Y
θ = The remoteness term ensures that 
with increasing bilateral transport costs between two trading partners expenditures 
on bilateral trade are smaller than under the assumption of Cobb-Douglas 
preferences. However, homothetic CES utility functions have a decisive 
disadvantage when some of the trade data is zero, e.g. when examining trade on a 
disaggregated product level. As homothetic CES utility specifications do not allow 
for zero utility when income is positive and the product is consumed in other 
countries, and thus zero trade is theoretically infeasible, the assumption of
homotheticity is infeasible.
Non-homothetic CES utility functions may help to overcome this problem. 
Considering a non-homothetic CES utility function, the expansion path has an 
intercept that is unequal to zero but is still linear (quasi-homothetic preferences), 
and/or is not longer a straight line (strictly non-homothetic preferences). That 
means, the expansion path can be shifted below the origin, which implies that 
consumers buy the product only if income exceeds a certain threshold. Non-
consumption of specific products and thus zero trade flows are theoretically 
probable. Non-homothetic preferences have been identified to impact trade 
substantially (Francois and Kaplan 1996, Hunter 1991, Hunter and Markusen 
1988). Tchamourliyski (2002) provides evidence that ignoring non-homotheticity 
overstates the importance of distance for trade considerably. 
Gravity in Ricardian trade models
Davis (1995) opens the gravity equation for technological differences across 
countries and inserts Ricardian elements into the theoretical derivation. Even 
though the Ricardian trade model is less prevalent in the theoretical discussion 
about gravity models, it can deliver simple structural equations for bilateral trade 
when applied in relation to geographic barriers. Eaton and Kortum (2002) derive a 
multi-country Ricardian trade model with perfect competition, constant returns to 
iα
i
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scale, and geographic barriers. The model is based on a two-country Ricardian 
trade model with a continuum of goods (cf. Dornbusch et al. 1977). Specialization 
is governed by geographic barriers as well as by technology. Efficiency varies 
across commodities and countries. The technological heterogeneity is depicted in a 
probabilistic formulation which is chosen to be Fréchet, ( ) iT ziF z e
γ−−= , where 
( )iF z is the country-specific probability distribution of its efficiency in 
production, 0iT > and 1γ > . The parameters iT and γ allow to develop a model 
with many countries that differ in the basic Ricardian sense of absolute and 
comparative advantage across a continuum of goods. The country-specific 
parameter iT enables the model to display absolute advantages across products; iT
appoints the location of the efficiency distribution and is interpreted as state of 
technology in country i . The parameter γ reflects heterogeneity across goods in 
countries’ relative efficiencies and is assumed to be common to all countries; it 
appoints the comparative advantage within the continuum of goods. A lower γ
implies more variability and thus brings about a stronger force for trade against the 
trade impediments of geographic barriers. Eaton and Kortum (2002) imply perfect 
competition and mobility of inputs within a country. A CES utility function is 
maximized subject to a budget constraint which aggregates spending. They obtain 
the following equation:
ln ln ,ij ij i j
jj
M
D S S
M
γ
′
= − + −
′
(3)
where ijM ′ are transformed trade flows from country to country j , 1ijD ≥ is 
the tariff equivalent of bilateral border barriers (Samuelson’s (1952) iceberg 
tariffs), and iS is country i ’s state of technology adjusted for its labor costs. 
Substituting ijD in equation (3) with proxies for geographic barriers of the 
standard gravity literature enables to estimate the impact of regulatory instruments.
i
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Gravity in Armington-like trade models
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) pick up the idea of relative transport costs 
presented in Deardorff (1998). Based on Anderson‘s (1979) expenditure system 
with homothetic CES preferences and Armington-like product differentiation,11
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) develop a gravity model which is the product 
of the simple gravity structure and a relative transport cost term called multilateral 
resistance. Consumers in importing country j maximize a homothetic CES utility 
function:
( )( )
( )/ 1
1 /1 / ,j i ij
i
U a x
σ σ
σ σσ σ
−
−− =  
 
∑ (4)
s.t. budget constraint ij ij j
i
p x Y=∑ .
When preferences are supposed to be identical and homothetic, the utility 
function’s share parameter ia is the same for all importing countries j concerning 
a specific exporter i . The value of goods consumed in importing country j with 
origin in country i is ij ij ijx p M= . Parameter ijp is the c.i.f. price in the importing 
country and can alternatively be written as ij i ijp p t= , with ijt being Samuelson’s 
(1952) iceberg trade costs which are proportional to the quantity of trade (including 
transportation costs and a set of border barriers such as regulatory instruments). 
The supply price ip can be understood as f.o.b. price. Parameter σ represents the 
elasticity of substitution for all pairs of goods, and jY is country j ’s income. 
Maximizing the utility function with respect to the budget constraint brings about 
the expenditure share. Multiplying the expenditure share with aggregate 
11 Anderson (1979) first derives the gravity equation from models assuming product differentiation by 
country of origin, which ensures intraindustry specialization in a world of perfect competition and 
constant returns (cf. Armington 1969).
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expenditure in importing country j produces the value of imports from exporter .i
The general equilibrium structure of the model implies that revenues equal 
expenditures, thus markets are cleared. Prices are normalized and the market 
clearance condition is used to solve for the product of share coefficients ia and
prices ip . This is possible because the share parameter is the same for all importers 
with respect to a specific exporter. After some substitution and conversion, and 
under the assumption of symmetric trade barriers in bilateral trade, Anderson and 
van Wincoop’s (2003) gravity equation becomes
1
i j ij
ij w
i j
YY t
M
Y PP
σ−
 
=   
 
, (5)
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∑ , w j
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Y Y=∑ , and jj w
Y
Y
θ = .
The first expression on the right-hand-side of the equal sign in gravity equation (5)
is the well known simple gravity structure. The second expression in this equation
relates bilateral trade costs ijt to a product consisting out of multilateral resistance 
variables, iP and jP , which are not observable. They can be interpreted as the 
average trade barrier of exporting and importing countries with all their trade 
partners (Anderson and van Wincoop 2003, Baier and Bergstrand 2002).12 The 
multilateral price terms iP and jP can be estimated consistently using either a 
complex non-linear estimation technique, or by introducing country-specific fixed 
effects (cf. Feenstra 2004, Rose and van Wincop 2001).
12 The concept of ‘multilateral resistance’ is also used in Hummels (2001) and Bergstrand (1989, 
1985).
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Gravity in monopolistic competition trade models
Recent empirical literature on effects of regulatory instruments on trade is mostly 
based on monopolistic competition and increasing returns (Disdier et al. 2008a, 
Carrère 2006, de Frahan and Vancauteren 2006). Markets are characterized by a 
large number of firms, each of them completely specialized in different product 
varieties as returns to scale are assumed to be increasing. There is free entry of 
markets whenever economic profits are positive, so in the long run equilibrium 
profits have to be zero. First mathematical formulations of the monopolistic 
competition model were made by Lancester (1979, 1975), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), 
and Spence (1976). Helpman and Krugman (1985) developed an increasing returns 
to scale model and Bergstrand (1989) allowed additionally for factor endowment 
differentials and non-homothetic preferences. Feenstra (2004) shows that assuming 
free trade, identical prices in all countries, and identical and homothetic demand 
across countries, a good produced in any country is consumed in any country 
according to the country’s purchasing GDP. Prices are normalized. Then kiy
measures the production value of product variety k in country i . Let GDP in each 
country be ki i
k
Y y=∑ , where 1,2,...,k N= is the number of varieties of goods
produced in country i . World GDP is w i
i
Y Y=∑ . If trade is balanced, jj w
Y
Y
θ =
denotes country j ’s share of world expenditure, and thus country j ’s share of 
world GDP. Then trade of product k from exporter i to importer j is given by 
k k
ij j iM yθ= . Summing over all products k , Feenstra (2004) obtains
j ik k
ij ij j i j i w
k k
Y Y
M M y Y
Y
θ θ= = = =∑ ∑ , (6)
which is again the simple gravity equation that was seen in equation (1). 
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2.2 Econometric application of the gravity model
This section discusses how the above described trade models are applied in 
econometric approaches, and provides available results on estimated impacts of 
border barriers in general and technical regulations in particular on (agri-food) 
trade. An overview of presented methodology is displayed in Table 1 at the end of 
this section. The simple log-linear regression model estimated by OLS seems to be 
quite appropriate to explain the existence of gravity in international trade. But 
some model specifications and especially the properties and condition of the data 
makes it necessary to look at more sophisticated econometric procedures. Recent 
literature provides estimation techniques accounting for the problems associated 
with the standard estimation procedure. Possible solutions being discussed in this 
section comprise the non-linear estimation model, fixed effects and random effects 
model, the sample selection model, Poisson, as well as the negative binomial 
Poisson and the zero-inflated, negative binomial Poisson model.
Log-linear regression models and ordinary least squares
In a log-linear form, allowing the coefficients of the right-hand-side variables to 
vary from unity, the simple gravity model looks like
1 2ln ln lnij i jM c Y Yβ β= + + , (7)
where ln wc Y= − . Tinbergen (1962) uses a simple regression model to explain the 
value of bilateral trade by the economic size of trading partners and their distance. 
In its simplest form, he estimates the log-linear model
0 1 2 3ln ln ln lnij i j ij ijM Y Y D uβ β β β= + + + + (8)
on cross-sectional trade data of 18 countries for the year 1958, where ijD is the 
geographic distance between two trading partners and iju is the error term which is 
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independent and identically distributed with zero mean and constant variance 
( )20,IID σ . In further extensions, he includes dummy variables for neighboring 
countries, for membership in the Commonwealth and membership in the Benelux. 
Estimation is done by OLS. He estimates a substantial negative trade effect of 
increasing distance between countries, while all included dummy variables have 
slightly positive impacts on bilateral trade performance. McCallum (1995) uses the 
log-linear gravity model to estimate the trade impact of the border between 
Canadian provinces and United States (US) states. He includes a dummy variable 
which equals one for interprovincial trade and zero for province-to-state trade. 
Cross-sectional data for the year 1988 is applied. The estimates of the border effect 
reveal that interprovincial trade is an astonishing 22 times larger than cross-border 
trade.
However, four considerable problems are associated with this specification, as 
depending on the structure of the data the estimates might be biased an inefficient. 
First, omitting unobserved country-pair heterogeneity such as multilateral 
resistance may cause biased estimates as trade is also determined by relative trade 
barriers (Baldwin and Taglioni 2006, Anderson and van Wincoop 2003). Second, 
the occurrence of zero trade flows makes log-linearization infeasible and results in 
sample selection bias when dropping these observations (Helpman et al. 2008, 
Silva and Tenreyro 2006). Third, as a result of potential unobserved firm level 
heterogeneity which allows the number of exporting firms to vary across importing 
countries, it has to be taken into account that the regulatory measures’ trade impact 
may have to be decomposed into the intensive and extensive margin (Helpman et 
al. 2008, Silva and Tenreyro 2006). And fourth, the assumption of homoscedastic 
errors is questionable when trade flows for small and remote countries approaching
zero are combined with large trade flows in the estimation (Martin and Pham 2008, 
Silva and Tenreyro 2006).
The following three models (non-linear regression model, fixed effects model, 
random effects model) tackle the problem of unobserved country-pair 
heterogeneity, and thus deal with the first problem mentioned above.
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Non-linear regression models
Assuming monopolistic competition and a CES expenditure system with identical 
and homothetic preferences, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) develop a theory-
consistent, non-linear gravity model which is estimated by NLS and specifies a 
trade cost factor which is able to include different variables for regulatory 
instruments. As McCallum (1995), they compare international trade flows between 
Canadian provinces and states in the US with intranational trade between US states 
among themselves and Canadian provinces among each other in a cross-sectional 
data structure. Their estimated model being derived from equation (5) looks as 
follows:
( ) ( ) ( )0 1 2ln ln 1 1 ln 1 lnij ij i j ij
i j
M
d P P
YY
β β β δ σ σ ε
 
= + + − − − − − +  
 
(9)
s.t. ( )1 2ln 11 1 ij ijdj i i
i
P P e
β β δσ σ θ + −− −=∑ ∀ j ,
where ( )1 1β σ ρ= − , ( )2 1 ln bβ σ= − , σ is the elasticity of substitution 
between all goods, δ is a dummy variable equal to one for interprovincial trade 
and zero for state-province trade, ,ii w
Y
Y
θ = and ijε is an error term which is
( )20,IID εσ , where 2εσ is the error’s variance. In Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003) the trade cost factor (cf. equation (5)) is modeled as ij ij ijt b d
ρ= , where 1b −
is the tariff equivalent of the US-Canadian border barrier which can be modified in 
a way to capture specific regulatory measures (cf. de Frahan and Vancauteren 
2006) and ijd is the distance between both trading regions. Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003) solve for the multilateral resistance variables iP and jP implicitly 
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and estimate the coefficients 0β , 1β , and 2β using NLS. On the country GDP 
variables they impose unitary coefficients.
The impact of multilateral resistance variables on the regression outcome is
evident when comparing results of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) with results 
of McCallum (1995). One explanation for the tremendous border effect in 
McCallum (1995) is his ignorance of multilateral resistance (and country 
heterogeneity caused by unobservables). Anderson and van Wincoop estimate 
McCallum’s gravity equation once again for the year 1993 and get a 16.4 times 
larger intraprovince trade than province-to-state trade. Estimating their own gravity 
model for 1993 including multilateral resistance reduces the Canadian border effect 
to 10.5, suggesting that estimates of the simple linear regression model are biased. 
Fixed effects models
One feasible alternative for NLS estimation of Anderson and van Wincoop’s 
(2003) gravity model is the incorporation of country-specific or country-pair-
specific fixed effects which capture unobserved country or country-pair 
heterogeneity such as multilateral resistance (Feenstra 2004, Rose and van 
Wincoop 2001). Fixed effects models yield similar results to the case when 
multilateral resistance variables are included directly. In gravity application, fixed 
effects cover unobserved variables which are specific to cross-sectional units 
(exporter and/or importer components) and/or to time periods (Egger 2000). In the 
three-dimensional panel setting with country-specific fixed effects, the fixed effects 
model has the form
ijt ijt i j ijtm x uβ α α′= + + + , (10)
with iα and jα being fixed effects of the exporting and importing countries which 
are constant over time, ijtm and ijtx being vectors of logarithmic dependent and 
explanatory variables, β being a vector of coefficients which are time-invariant 
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and constant for all bilateral combinations, and ijtu being the combined cross-
sectional and time series error term which is ( )20, uIID σ . The intercept varies for 
each cross-sectional unit, but slope coefficients are constant across units. The fixed 
effects iα and jα may include country-specific size and price effects (such as 
multilateral resistance variables). Whereas the explanatory variables have to be 
strictly exogenous conditional on the fixed effects, i.e. ( )| , , 0ijt ijt i jE u x α α = ∀
t , the fixed effects are allowed to be any function of the explanatory variables: 
( )| 0i ijtE xα ≠ and ( )| 0j ijtE xα ≠ . For estimating fixed effects models, 
equation (10) is transformed in a way that observations in deviation from 
individual means are produced:
( ) ( )ijt ij ijt ij ijt ijm m x x u uβ′− = − + − , (11)
where 1ij ijt
t
m T m−= ∑ , and the individual fixed effects iα and jα are dropped
out through the demeaning procedure. The transformed model can be estimated by 
an OLS estimator, which is then called the within estimator (Verbeek 2004). Using
the within estimator means everything that is time-invariant is eliminated from the 
model. Unfortunately, direct estimation of country-specific effects of potentially 
important explanatory variables like NTMs which are time-invariant is then not 
possible anymore. However, running the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) 
estimation
ijt i ij ijt ijt
i
m d x uα β′= + +∑ , (12)
where 1ijd = if i j= , and 0ijd = if i j≠ , additionally yields estimates for the 
coefficients of included fixed effects, and time-invariant observables which are not 
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perfectly correlated with ijd are not dropped. This regression, however, can be 
very cost-intensive in terms of degrees of freedoms as coefficients of many 
regressors have to be estimated. 
Disdier et al. (2008a) and Disider et al. (2008b) analyze impacts of regulations 
notified under the SPS and TBT Agreement on agricultural trade flows. Their 
gravity model is built upon monopolistic competition and CES utility functions. A 
two-dimensional cross-sectional dataset is employed, meaning the time subscript is 
skipped. Fixed effects variables are included on an HS 2-digit sector level. 
Products are aggregated on an HS 4-digit level, as well as data on SPS and TBT 
notifications and tariffs. Zero trade flows are being treated as missing. LSDV
estimation is employed. Results show that SPS and TBT measures altogether have 
a negative impact on trade in agricultural products. Especially exports from 
developing and least developed countries are negatively affected, whereas trade 
within Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
countries is not influenced significantly. The analysis also shows that even 
European Union (EU) member countries notify less SPS and TBT measures than 
other OECD countries, these measures are more trade restricting than the ones 
adopted by other OECD countries. Research on estimating the effect of a specific 
regulation employing a fixed effects model is done by Wilson and Otsuki (2001), 
Otsuki et al. (2001a) and Otsuki et al. (2001b). All three articles estimate the 
impact of a maximum residue level (MRL) of aflatoxin on trade in different 
products like cereals, nuts, dried fruits and vegetables which are mostly exported 
from African countries to the EU. The authors employ a panel dataset for the years 
1989 to 1998 and 1995 to 1998. Estimation results show that tighter European 
regulations for aflatoxin would reduce African exports to the EU substantially. The 
difference between possible exports under the regulations established by the Codex 
Alimentarius and exports likely under the discussed new European rules would 
amount to 63%. Moenius (2004) utilizes a fixed effects model to analyze whether 
harmonized standards yield greater trade flows than country-specific product and 
process standards. A panel dataset is constructed for 471 industries in 12 different 
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countries on a 4-digit standard international trade classification (SITC) level for the 
years 1985 to 1995. Moenius (2004) concludes that generally harmonized 
standards are favorable in comparison to country-specific standards. However, 
country-specific standards do not present a trade barrier per se. The author
differentiates between manufactured and non-manufactured goods (like agricultural 
goods). The negative trade effect prevails just for the latter.
Random effects models
Like the fixed effects model, the random effects model is an unobserved effects 
model. The difference between both models is that in the former the included 
unobserved heterogeneity effects are allowed to be correlated with the observed 
explanatory variables, whereas in the latter they have to be independent of the 
explanatory variables (Egger 2005). The random effects model is represented 
according to 
ijt ijt i j ijtm x uµ β α α′= + + + + , (13)
( )20,ijtu IID εσ∼ , ( )20, ii IID αα σ∼ , and ( )20, jj IID αα σ∼ ,
where the dependent and explanatory variables are logarithmic. The composite 
error term ijt i j ijtu α α ε= + + is made up from (cross-sectional) exporter and 
importer random drawings iα and jα and a residual component ijtε which is 
uncorrelated over time. The intercepts are different across individuals, but they can 
be treated as drawings from a distribution with mean µ and variances 2
iα
σ and
2
jα
σ , respectively. 
De Frahan and Vancauteren (2006) employ a Tobit random effects model on a 
panel dataset for the years 1990 to 2001 and estimate the model using weighted 
ML. They analyze the effect of harmonization of EU food regulation on intra-EU 
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trade on a product-specific level. The trade data on agri-food products is grouped 
according to the 4-digit nomenclature générale des activités économiques dans les 
Communautés européennes (NACE) industrial classification. When analyzing trade 
data on disaggregated product levels bilateral trade flows may be zero, caused by
missing data or due to non-existent trade. Dropping these observations leads to 
nonrandom selection bias which causes specification errors and biased estimates in 
econometric analysis (Heckman 1979). The Tobit model is particularly appropriate 
to estimate a model including zero trade flows because it censors observations at 
zero. However, before being log-linearized, zero trade flows have to be changed to 
any small positive number, e.g. to one, which presents an a-theoretic 
transformation of the data.
The Tobit model goes back to Tobin (1958) and was extended in the following 
decades (Amemiya 1984). The standard Tobit model in a panel setting is presented 
according to the equations
,
0,
0 0,
ijt ijt ijt
ijt ijt ijt
ijt ijt
m x u
m m if m
m if m
β∗
∗ ∗
∗
′= +
= >
= ≤
(14)
where the latent response variable ijtm
∗ is the assumed solution to the model and 
can be positive, zero, or negative. The observed variable ijtm is positive if the 
latent variable is positive, or it is zero if the latent variable is zero or negative. The 
error term ijtu captures the unobserved heterogeneity and is assumed to be 
( )20, uIID σ . Estimation is usually done by ML. De Frahan and Vancauteren 
(2006) conclude that harmonization of food regulation stimulates intra-European 
trade at different levels of product aggregation significantly. The strength of the 
Determining the trade impact of regulatory measures
27
positive impact depends on the particular food sector considered. Fontagné et al. 
(2005) estimate a Tobit random effects model for analyzing the impact of 
environmental trade barriers across 161 product groups (agricultural and non-
agricultural products) in a setting of 114 exporting and 61 importing countries. 
Trade data is cross-sectional for the year 2001. Results of Fontagné et al. (2005) 
support findings of Moenius (2004): The trade impact of regulatory measures 
depends on the level of processing of the traded product. While the effect of 
environmental trade barriers on fresh and processed goods is mostly negative, it is 
insignificant or even positive for most manufactured goods. Eaton and Kortum 
(2002) estimate a cross-sectional multi-country Ricardian trade model. Trade flows 
of manufactures of 19 OECD countries are included for the year 1990. They 
estimate negative impacts for the distance parameter, and positive values for the 
included dummy variables. 
Sample selection models
The sample selection model solves for the second shortcoming, namely the way 
non-existent trade flows are dealt with. An extension of the sample selection model 
also solves for the third identified problem, which is accounting for unobserved 
firm level heterogeneity.
The more disaggregated the product classification the more zeros appear in the 
datasets. The sample selection (or Heckman or Tobit II) model takes advantage of 
the presence of non-existent trade flows by making a selection of country-pairs 
trading and not trading with each other (sample selection). The model consists of 
two parts which are usually estimated via two separate equations. 
First, the selection equation investigates the binary decision whether or not to 
trade by a Probit maximum likelihood model:
( ) ( )1 1 1Pr 1| , ,ij ijh x G xρ β= = = (15)
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where ijρ is the probability that country i exports to country j conditional on the 
observed variables 1x describing different sorts of trade costs potentially including 
fixed effects, and ijh is a binary variable indicating whether a trade flow from 
country i to j is positive ( 1ijh = ) or zero ( 0ijh = ). The function ( ).G is a
cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the bivariate normal distribution and is 
therefore in the interval [ ]0,1 .
Second, the trade flow equation, or the conditional expected trade flow given 
that the trade observation is positive, is given by
{ } 2 2 12| 1ij ij ijE m h x β σ λ= = + , (16)
where ijm is the logarithmic observed trade flow from country i to country j
given that the observed trade flow ijh is positive, and 2x denotes a vector of 
logarithmic observed trade cost characteristics. As in the selection equation (15), 
the unobserved errors are assumed to be distributed bivariate normal.13 The 
covariance 12σ of the unobserved errors (or unobserved trade costs) of the 
selection and the trade flow equation is estimated as a coefficient in equation (16). 
Following Heckman (1979), Heckman’s lambda 
( )
( )
1 1
1 1
ij
x
x
φ β
λ
β
=
Φ
controls for 
sample selection and can be calculated after estimating equation (15); the 
calculated estimate iˆjλ replaces ijλ in equation (16).
13 In principle, 1x and 2x can be identical, returning to the standard Tobit I model (Verbeek 2004). 
However, the estimation of the trade flow equation (16) requires the exclusion of a variable if the 
identification of the trade flow equation’s coefficients 2β shall not rely on both equations’ normality 
assumption for the error terms (i.e. for the unobserved trade costs). Helpman et al. (2008) argue that 
the excluded variable has to be uncorrelated with the trade flow equation’s error terms: The excluded 
variable must influence trade only through fixed trade costs because variable trade costs impact the 
extent of the volume of trade, thus variable trade costs are not uncorrelated with equation (16).
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Helpman et al. (2008) extend the Heckman approach by not only controlling for 
sample selection through variable λ , but also accounting for unobserved firm level 
heterogeneity. The basic idea of firm level heterogeneity is that firms differ in their 
productivity levels in a way that only sufficiently productive firms are able to 
export by overcoming market entry costs such as NTMs. In their model the impact 
of trade frictions is decomposed into the trade volume per exporter and the number
of exporters. Helpman et al. (2008) include an additional control variable 
accounting for the selection of firms into the export market. The trade flow 
equation then is 
{ } 2 2 12| 1ij ij ij ijE m h x β σ λ ω= = + + , (17)
where ijω controls for the fraction of firms exporting from i to j (which is 
possibly zero).14
Even though the Heckman and the Helpman approaches provide a natural way
of dealing with zero counts, the trade flow equation (16) or equation (17) have to 
be transformed logarithmically which may cause biased estimates (Silva and 
Tenreyro 2006, Haworth and Vincent 1979). Another problem with this kind of 
model is the strict assumption of normality, unrealistically assuming homoscedastic 
error terms for all pairs of origins and destinations.
Poisson models
In contrast to the sample selection model, the Poisson specification of the gravity 
model handles all four above mentioned problems. First, omitted country-pair 
heterogeneity such as multilateral resistance is adhered to by including fixed 
effects. Second, because of its multiplicative form, the Poisson specification 
provides a natural way of dealing with zero trade flows. Third, unobserved firm 
14 Parameter ijω can be calculated from the estimates obtained by the sample selection equation (15),
cf. equation (14) in Helpman et al. (2008).
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level heterogeneity can be provided for in the model. And fourth, Poisson 
regression estimates are consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity and are 
reasonably efficient, especially in large samples.
Given the vector of logarithmic observed trade cost characteristics x , the 
expected value of the trade flow ijM is given by
{ } ( )| expijE M x xβ= . (18)
This functional form is a good choice in modeling gravity equations because it 
produces non-negative conditional expectations without constraining the 
explanatory variables. When the trade flow variable ijM is assumed to follow a 
Poisson distribution, a likelihood function can be derived whose first and second 
order moment conditions can be solved to obtain the vector of coefficients 
(Gourieroux et al. 1984).
The multiplicative form of the Poisson model allows estimating the gravity 
equation without logarithmic transformation of the trade flow observation ijM . 
However, the Poisson assumption imposes restrictions on the conditional moments 
of the explained variable:
( ) ( )| | .ij ijE M x V M x∝ (19)
That means the conditional mean is assumed to equal the conditional variance 
(equidispersion). 
In their econometric application Silva and Tenreyro (2006) deploy the Poisson 
model estimation on a dataset including typical explanatory variables of gravity 
models such as GDP per capita, population, distance, remoteness and several 
dummies. Cross-sectional data are used for the year 1990 for 136 countries, each of 
them exporting and importing. The authors compare results of OLS, Tobit, and 
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NLS estimation with the PPML outcome. Pseudo-maximum likelihood (PML) can 
be understood as a general methods of moments estimator with moment conditions 
corresponding to the first and second order conditions of maximum likelihood. If 
the ML estimator is based on a wrong likelihood function, but the conditional mean 
or variance (first and second order moments) are correctly specified, the estimation 
can be based on these moment conditions without knowing the correct distribution 
of the errors. The pseudo-likelihood function is specified appropriately as long as it 
is based on a probability density function (pdf) that is a member of the family of 
linear exponential functions, such as the normal or the Poisson pdf (Mittelhammer
et al. 2000). PML then produces consistent and efficient estimates (Verbeek 2004, 
Mittelhammer et al. 2000).
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) find substantial differences in estimated coefficients, 
suggesting that heteroscedasticity influences results and that log-linearization leads 
to significant biases. This outcome is supported by Siliverstos and Schumacher
(2008) who compare OLS with Poisson estimates. They use 3-digit international 
standard industrial classification (ISIC) trade data of the years 1988 to 1990 for 22 
OECD countries and conclude that estimation of the log-linearized gravity equation 
leads to inconsistencies, whereas the non-linear approach is more appropriate. 
However, Olper and Raimondi (2008) find support in their agricultural trade data 
that Heckman’s two stage procedure (first stage: Probit model, second stage: OLS 
model) based on a fixed effects model produces similar results as PPML 
estimation. 
Even though the four shortcomings are solved by the Poisson model, the 
presence of unobserved heterogeneity which is caused by unobserved trade costs is 
not taken into account by it, and consequently the conditional variance is most 
often higher than the conditional mean (overdispersion). According to Gourieroux 
et al. (1984), overdispersion brings out consistent, but inefficient estimates. A 
negative binomial Poisson regression model, which belongs to the family of 
modified Poisson models, can be employed in order to address the occurrence of 
overdispersion appropriately.
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Negative binomial Poisson models
The expected value of the observed trade flow in the negative binomial Poisson 
model equals the one in the Poisson regression model, i.e. equals equation (18). 
However, the variance is not only specified according to a function of the 
conditional mean, but an additional term α is included which serves as a 
dispersion parameter:
( ) ( )( ) ( )2| 1 exp expijV M x x xα β β= + (20)
(Verbeek 2004, Cameron and Trivedi 1986). The additional dispersion parameter 
α allows the conditional variance to exceed the conditional mean and it 
determines the degree of the variance’s dispersion. As a result, the unobserved 
heterogeneity is incorporated into the negative binomial Poisson model (Cameron 
and Trivedi 1986). 
The incidence of overdispersion realistically allows explaining the occurrence 
of zeros by two different processes, leading to an extension of the pure negative 
binomial Poisson model.
Zero-inflated, negative binomial Poisson models (ZINBP)
As Burger et al. (2009) point out, overdispersion can hold for an explanation of an 
excessive number of zeros in the dataset. The number of zeros is excessive if it is 
greater than the Poisson or the negative binomial distribution predicts. The 
occurrence of excessive zeros can be explained by a second, ‘non-Poissoness’ 
process (Johnson and Kotz 1969). It originates in the fact that not all pairs of 
countries have the potential to trade, be it due to a lack of resources or due to trade 
embargos. In this case the trade probability is zero by definition. In contrast, 
‘Poissoness’ zeros stem from the fact that distances and differences in preferences 
and specializations may be too big, i.e. a negative cost shock makes the trade 
volumes equal to zero even if in this case the trade probability is theoretically 
different from zero.
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To account for these two different processes, the zero-inflated model considers the 
existence of two latent groups within the population; a group being ‘non-Poisson’, 
i.e. having a strictly zero probability to trade, and a group being ‘Poisson’, i.e. 
having a non-zero probability of observing positive trade flows. Three different 
groups of pairs of countries can be defined. First, pairs of countries having exactly 
a zero probability to trade and thus do not trade at all; second, pairs of countries 
with a non-zero probability to trade but which nevertheless do not trade; and third, 
pairs of countries with a non-zero probability to trade which are actually trading.
The two processes underlying the model are estimated in two parts. Equal to the 
first step in the Heckman model, the ZINBP model contains a Probit regression to 
estimate the probability of no bilateral trade at all (‘non-Poisson’ zeros). The 
second step is a negative binomial Poisson regression given that each of the
country-pairs included have a non-zero probability (‘Poisson’ zeros).
The ZINBP model exceeds the sample selection model in several ways. It 
accounts for unobserved heterogeneity in the population with a zero count. 
Additionally, the ZINBP model is less restrictive, as it does not rely on stringent 
normality assumptions, nor does it require the exclusion of an explanatory variable 
in the second stage of the model. Furthermore, the bias created by the logarithmic 
transformation in the trade flow equation is not created in the zero-inflated, 
negative binomial Poisson model.
Xiong and Beghin (2011) replicate the analysis of Otsuki et al. (2001b) on the 
trade impacts of a change in European aflatoxin standards on African exports 
considering two important improvements. They include time variation in pesticide 
MRLs and they take into account the presence of zero trade flows in bilateral trade. 
The sample includes 14 European countries as importers and nine African 
countries as exporters as well as the three products edible groundnut, groundnut oil, 
and shelled groundnut. Xiong and Beghin (2011) compare the results of different 
estimators and conclude that the omission of the “multilateral resistance” terms 
induces severe biases to the estimates. They point out that the Poisson-like 
estimators are not robust when zero trade flows are pervasive. Unlike in previous 
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econometric analyses of EU aflatoxin policies, Xiong and Beghin (2011) find out 
that harmonization and tightening of aflatoxin regulations within the EU has no 
significant effects on African groundnut exports. This empirical result surely 
challenges the conventional view that a stricter food safety regulation negatively 
impacts trade.
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Table 1 Gravity model analyses
Author Regions Time 
period
Products Specific 
regulation
Model Estimator Dependent 
variable
Explanatory variables
Linear regression models
Tinbergen 
(1962)
18-42 
countries
1958, 
1959
Total bilateral 
trade
No Log-linear 
model
OLS Log of 
bilateral 
trade value
Log of gross national product  (GNP) exporter 
and importer; log of distance; dummies: 
contiguity - Commonwealth - Benelux - Gini 
coefficient
McCallum 
(1995)
10 Canadian 
provinces, 30 
US states
1988 Total bilateral 
trade
No Log-linear 
model
OLS Log of 
bilateral 
trade value
Log of GDP exporter and importer; log of 
distance; dummies: border
Non-linear regression models
Anderson 
and van 
Wincoop 
(2003)
10 Canadian 
provinces, 30 
US states
1993 Total bilateral 
trade
No Log-non-
linear 
regression 
model
NLS Log of size-
adjusted 
bilateral 
trade value
Distance; multilateral resistance; dummy: 
border
Fixed effects models
Otsuki et al. 
(2001a)
9 African 
exporters, 
15 European 
importers
1989-
1998
Cereals, dried 
fruits, nuts, 
vegetables
MRL of 
aflatoxin
Log-linear 
model with 
fixed 
effects
LSDV Log of 
bilateral 
trade value
Importer fixed effetcs; log of GNP per capita 
(p.c.) exporter and importer; log of distance; 
log of aflatoxin level; dummies: year -
colonial ties
Otsuki et al. 
(2001b)
9 African 
exporters, 15 
European 
importers
1989-
1999
Edible 
groundnut, 
groundnut oil, 
groundnuts for 
oilseeds
MRL of 
aflatoxin
Log-linear 
model with 
fixed 
effects
LSDV Log of 
bilateral 
trade value
Exporter fixed effects; log of GNP p.c. 
exporter and importer; log of distance, log of 
aflatoxin level; log of rain; dummies: colonial 
ties - year
Wilson and 
Otsuki 
(2001)
31 exporters, 
15 importers
1995-
1998
Wheat, rice, 
maize, dried and 
preserved fruits, 
nuts
MRL of 
aflatoxin
Log-linear 
model with 
fixed 
effects
LSDV, 
weighted 
least squares
Log of 
bilateral 
trade value
Exporter fixed effects; log of GNP exporter 
and importer; log of distance; log of aflatoxin 
level; dummies: colonial ties - membership in 
regional trade agreement (RTA) – year
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Fixed effects models (continued)
Moenius 
(2004)
12 countries 1985-
1995
471 industries, 
four-digit SITC 
level
Shared 
standards 
versus
country-
specific 
standards
Log-linear 
model with 
fixed 
effects
OLS, 
instrumental 
variable (IV)
Log of 
bilateral 
trade value
Country-pair-year fixed effects; log of number 
of shared standards; log of country-specific 
stock of standards; time trend
Disdier et al. 
(2008a)
183 exporting 
countries, 
OECD 
importers
2004 690 agricultural 
products
Count data, 
frequency 
index, and 
AVE of 
regulations
Log-linear 
model with 
fixed 
effects
OLS or 
LSDV
Log of 
bilateral 
trade value
Exporter and importer fixed effects; log of 
distance; tariffs; ad valorem equivalent (AVE)
of SPS and TBT regulation; dummies: border 
- language - colonial ties
Tobit models with random effects
de Frahan 
and 
Vancaute-
ren (2006)
10 European 
importers, 15 
European
exporters
1990-
2001
10 agricultural 
sub-sectors
Coverage 
ratios of 
bilateral 
harmoni-
zation
Log-linear 
random 
effect 
Tobit 
model
Weighted 
ML
Log of 
bilateral 
trade value
Random effects; log of output in exporting 
and expenditure in importing country; log of 
distance; measure of competitiveness; 
coverage ratio of bilateral harmonization; 
dummies: contiguity - language
Fontagné et 
al. (2005)
114 exporters, 
61 importers
2001 161 product 
groups (also 
non-agricutural)
Environmen-
tal-related 
notifica-
tions
Log-linear 
random 
effect 
Tobit 
model
Random 
effects 
estimator
Log of size-
adjusted 
bilateral 
trade value
Random effects; log of difference in p.c. GDP; 
log of telephone density; log of distance; 
tariff; population density; environmental trade 
barriers; dummies: contiguity - culture -
landlock – least developed country –
developed country – OECD
Eaton and 
Kortum 
(2002)
19 OECD 
countries
1990 Trade of 
manufactures
No Log-linear 
model with 
random 
effects
Random 
effects 
estimator
Log of 
transformed 
trade value
Exporter and importer random effects; interval 
of distance; dummies: contiguity - language –
regional trade agreement - destination 
Sample selection models
Helpman et 
al. (2008)
107 countries 1970-
1997
Total bilateral 
trade
Regulation 
costs
Two-step 
model with 
fixed 
effects
Probit ML 
and NLS
Bilateral 
trade value
Fixed effects; distance; dummies: border -
island - landlock - language - legal origin -
colonial ties - currency union - RTA - religion 
- WTO membership
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Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood regression models
Silva and 
Tenreyro 
(2006)
136 countries 1990 Total bilateral 
trade
No Poisson 
fixed 
effects 
model
PPML Bilateral 
trade value
Fixed effects; distance; dummies: contiguity -
language - colonial tie - RTA
Siliverstos 
and Schuma-
cher (2008)
22 OECD 
countries
1988-
1990
Total bilateral 
trade and 25 
disaggregated 
sectors
No Non-linear 
model
PPML Bilateral 
trade value
Capital-labor endowment ratio exporter; GNP 
p.c.importer; GNP exporter and importer; 
distance; dummies: membership in European 
Communities - contiguity - colonial ties –
language
Olper and 
Raimondi 
(2008)
22 OECD 
countries
1994-
2003
Agricultural 
bilateral trade
No Poisson 
fixed 
effects 
model
PPML Bilateral 
trade value
Fixed effetcs; distance; dummies: language -
contiguity - border
Negative binomial Poisson maximum likelihood regression models
Burger et al. 
(2009)
138 countries 1996-
2000
Total bilateral 
trade
No Poisson 
fixed 
effects 
model
PPML Bilateral 
trade volume
Fixed effects; distance; institutional distance; 
sectoral complementarities; dummies: 
language - contiguity - history - RTA
Zero-inflated, negative binomial Poisson maximum likelihood regression models
Burger et al. 
(2009)
138 countries 1996-
2000
Total bilateral 
trade
No Two-step 
model with 
fixed 
effects
Probit ML 
and PPML
Bilateral 
trade volume
Fixed effects; distance; institutional distance; 
sectoral complementarities; dummies: 
language - contiguity - history – RTA
Xiong and 
Beghin 
(2011)
14 European 
countries, 9 
African 
countries
1998-
2003
Trade in edible 
groundnut, 
groundnut oil, 
and shelled 
groundnut
Pesticide 
MRL
Two-step 
model with 
fixed 
effects
Probit ML 
and PPML
Bilateral 
trade volume
Fixed effects; MRL pesticides; GDP p.c. 
importer; supply exporter; distance; dummies: 
colonial ties - language
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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2.3 Conclusion of the chapter
The literature review in this chapter presents the variety of economic 
underpinnings of the gravity model and highlights methodological approaches to 
estimate the impact of border barriers such as regulatory measures econometrically.
The review reveals that the theoretical foundation of the gravity model has 
improved substantially since its first explicit formulation by Tinbergen (1962). The 
gravity model can be derived from Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardian trade theories 
as well as from monopolistic competition models and Armington-like 
specifications. The methodological improvements turn the gravity model into an 
instrument that is used extensively in applied trade economics. Despite these 
improvements challenges remain for impact assessment of technical regulations. 
Combined, the assumption of homothetic CES preferences and the inclusion of 
zero trade flows are theoretically inconsistent. A possible solution can be to switch 
to non-homothetic CES preferences, which has not been done so far in the 
empirical literature on impact analysis of specific border barriers. 
Econometric application of gravity models has improved as well. Various
approaches for estimating impacts of border barriers are applied and their merits 
and disadvantages are discussed. Depending on the structure of the data, simple 
log-linear regression models are not able to control for heterogeneity caused by 
unobservable determinants, do not handle zero trade flows appropriately, do not 
account for firm level heterogeneity, and do not consider heteroscedasticity. 
Therefore, it is highly probable that they produce biased and/or inconsistent 
estimates. 
The advantage of non-linear regression models over linear models is the chance 
to include better fitting functional forms and the possibility to provide for complex, 
non-linear explanatory variables like multilateral resistance or firm level 
heterogeneity which capture some of the heterogeneity caused by unobservables. 
Fixed effects models and random effects cover all country heterogeneity. When 
dealing with disaggregated product data and zero trade is prevalent, Tobit models 
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seem to produce consistent and unbiased estimates. However, log-linearizing 
makes it necessary to add the value one or any small number a-theoretically to zero 
trade flows. Sample selection models and their extensions also solve for the 
problem of non-existent trade flows and additionally account for unobserved firm 
level heterogeneity. However, they do not tackle the problem associated with the 
occurrence of heteroscedasticity in trade data. This is done in Poisson-type models 
which furthermore are able to resolve the problem of zero trade flows because they
do not require the logarithmic transformation of the left-hand-side trade flow 
values. Yet, the presence of unobserved heterogeneity is not taken into account by 
the Poisson model resulting in estimates which may be overdispersed. The negative 
binomial Poisson regression model solves for this problem by including a 
dispersion parameter. The incidence of overdispersion allows explaining the 
occurrence of non-existent trade flows by two different processes, the ‘Poisoness’ 
process and the ‘non-Poissoness’ process, leading to an extension of the negative 
binomial Poisson model, the zero-inflated, negative binomial regression model.
As seen, a multitude of approaches useful for analyzing the impact of NTMs in 
general and regulations in particular exist in the literature. Overall, there is no 
unifying method and the different approaches all have their advantages and 
disadvantages in terms of practicability, coverage and ability to capture certain 
features of regulatory measures. The empirical evidence of the trade effects of 
NTMs is mixed. The review of the econometric studies focusing on specific (agri-
food) products points out that some specific NTMs have a negative impact on trade 
flows of the respective product. Other studies do not report a negative trade effect
of NTMs, and finally, when harmonization of regulations and standards is 
considered, the study results even show positive trade impacts.
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3 Regulatory policies in meat trade: Is there evidence 
for least trade-distorting sanitary regulations?
Multilateral trade rules as in the SPS Agreement on trade in food and agricultural 
goods offer guidelines to policy makers on how to make use of regulatory 
instruments governing agrifood trade.15 The provisions of the SPS Agreement 
require that regulations targeting specific national agri-food safety objectives are 
minimal with respect to their trade effects (Article 5.4) and not more trade
restrictive than required (Article 5.6). Accordingly, Wilson and Antón (2006) 
define the most welfare-efficient SPS measure as one that is least trade distorting 
but protective in terms of providing the desired health and safety level. However, 
only limited knowledge exists on the specific trade impacts of different regulatory 
instruments available to enforce desired policy goals. Furthermore, the trade impact 
of regulatory instruments is not always negative; safe and healthy food, 
information transmission, increased producer efficiency, and increased consumer 
confidence may also imply positive trade impacts. 
Gravity models at various levels of detail have been mostly used to provide 
evidence on the trade impact of regulatory measures. At the aggregate level of 
agricultural trade, an example includes Disdier et al. (2008a), whereas Otsuki et al.
(2001a) analyze product-specific regulations. Another body of literature applies
partial equilibrium models in the quest for an optimal set of SPS measures 
regarding welfare impacts and risk mitigation strategies. Peterson and Orden 
(2008) identify an efficient sequence of SPS measures to address pest risks from 
Mexican avocado imports to the US market. The mentioned studies use different
methodological approaches but are similar in that they do not systematically 
compare the trade impacts of different regulatory instruments with equivalent risk 
reduction effects.
15 This chapter is based on the two papers Schlueter et al. (2009a) and Schlueter et al. (2009b).
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In analyzing the meat sector, the objective of this article is to test the hypothesis 
that different regulatory measures imposed to achieve a desired level of SPS health 
in a country have different implied trade effects. In addition, sanitary regulations 
are identified that most adequately conform to Articles 5.4 and 5.6 of the SPS 
Agreement, differentiated by classes of regulations and policy objectives. Meat 
products are chosen because trade in meat is exposed to a wide number of market 
failures. Diseases, pandemics, and meat and feed scandals in the last decade have 
increased consumers’ and producers’ awareness of external effects associated with 
trade in meat products. This motivates policy makers to implement regulatory 
instruments, which may also serve protectionist purposes. 
Using a frequency approach, detailed regulation specific data on sanitary 
measures is manually collected and compiled for the years 1996 to 2007. The 
information on these regulations is further differentiated by trading partner and 
year for each meat product line, resulting in a unique data set of regulatory 
measures that distinguishes all relevant SPS instruments applied for various agri-
food safety purposes in the meat sector. A non-linear panel data gravity model is 
estimated for the ten most important meat exporters and importers by fixed effects 
PPML at the level of HS 4-digit data.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The first section derives the 
applied gravity model and introduces the PPML estimator. The second section 
describes the explanatory and dependent variables and their data sources. The third
section presents estimation results on the impact of different aggregation levels of 
regulatory instruments and the fourth section concludes.
3.1 Theory and methodology
A non-linear panel data gravity model with fixed effects is estimated by Poisson 
pseudo-maximum likelihood (cf. Silva and Tenreyro 2006). Assuming frictionless 
trade, perfect competition, indifference of consumers’ choices between otherwise 
homogenous products of different origins, and specialization of countries in 
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different products, the gravity model describes bilateral trade flows by a function 
of exporter and importer GDP and world GDP (Deardorff 1998). Dropping the 
assumption of frictionless trade generally allows assessment of the impacts of any 
form of tariff or non-tariff barriers, including sanitary regulatory measures, by 
integrating different relevant variables potentially leading to “distance” between 
countries.
One difficulty of estimating gravity-type trade models is the existence of 
heteroscedasticity, which may cause inefficient and inconsistent estimates (Silva 
and Tenreyro 2006). Heteroscedasticity is present when trade flows for small and 
remote countries may approach zero. This causes the conditional variance 
( )|Var M x of the explained trade flow variable M , given a set of explanatory 
variables x , to tend to zero, as positive dispersions from the conditional mean 
cannot be offset by negative ones contrary to large trade flows where the variance 
can be expected to be larger as the dispersion from the conditional mean can go in 
either direction. For estimating gravity models, the least squares and non-linear 
least squares estimators cannot be efficient, as they require the conditional variance 
to be constant. Also, in the presence of heteroscedasticity, the error term of the log-
linearized version of the simple gravity equation can only be assumed to be 
independent from explanatory variables under very specific conditions on 
proportionality of the conditional variance. Consequently, all estimators of log-
linear models which ignore heteroscedasticity are generally inconsistent (Silva and 
Tenreyro 2006).
Pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation is able to handle inefficiencies and 
inconsistencies caused by heteroscedasticity. Furthermore, zero trade between 
particular country-pairs does not create inconsistencies, as in the case when the 
log-linear form of the gravity equation is used. The pseudo-likelihood function is 
specified appropriately as long as it is based on a probability density function that 
is a member of the family of linear exponential functions, such as the Poisson 
probability density function (Gourieroux et al. 1984). In employing a PPML 
estimator in their gravity application, Silva and Tenreyro (2006) start with a 
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stochastic model explaining a vector of bilateral trade flows M , which is derived 
from a utility-maximizing model assuming constant elasticity of substitution 
preferences (cf. Anderson 1979):
( )expM xβ ε= + , (21)
with 0M ≥ and [ ]| 0E xε = , where x is the vector of explanatory variables, β
is the vector of coefficients of interest, and ε is the error. This functional form is a 
good choice in modeling gravity equations because it produces non-negative 
conditional expectations (the value of bilateral trade flows is by definition non-
negative) without constraining the explanatory variables. When M for given x is 
assumed to follow a Poisson distribution, a pseudo likelihood function can be 
derived, whose first and second order moment conditions can be solved to obtain 
the vector of coefficients β (Gourieroux et al. 1984). The PPML estimator is fully 
robust to distributional misspecifications (Wooldridge 1999).
The multiplicative gravity model in this analysis is as follows:
31 2
4 5exp
k
ijt it jt ij i j t ijt k ijt ijt
k
M p c d z t rββ β α α β β β η = + + + + 
 
∑ , (22)
where ijtM is the trade flow value from exporter i to importer j at time t , itp
and jtc present the annual meat production and meat consumption quantities of 
exporter i and importer j representing the country’s economic size in this 
sectoral analysis, ijd is the bilateral distance between exporter i and importer j ,
iα and jα are country-specific exporter and importer fixed effects capturing 
unobserved country heterogeneity, tz is the time dummy variable, ijtt is the tariff 
variable, kijt
k
r∑ present k different regulatory measures which are included in 
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varying aggregation levels, and ijtη is a transformed error with | 1ijtE xη  = 
according to Silva and Tenreyro (2006).
Equation (22) can be written as exponential function
1 2 3 4 5exp ln ln ln ,
ijt
k
it jt ij i j t ijt k ijt ijt
k
M
p c d z t rβ β β α α β β β ε
=
 
+ + + + + + + + 
 
∑
(23)
which has the functional form of equation (21) and is estimated by PPML.
3.2 Data
This section displays and describes the data used in the case study. First, the data 
base on sanitary regulations, which is manually constructed for this analysis, is 
described and main findings are discussed. Then, the remaining model data are 
presented.
3.2.1 The SPS data base
Data on sanitary regulations is taken from the WTO SPS Information Management 
System (WTO 2009) and the International Portal on Food Safety, Animal and Plant 
Health (IPFSAPH 2009). This manual search and gathering of information on 
regulatory measures in the meat sector was necessary given that the conventional 
data bases for non-tariff measures such as the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) Trade Analysis and Information System (TRAINS) 
do not provide the necessary detail for a sector-specific analysis distinguishing 
different types of instruments applied.
Altogether 29 specific regulatory instruments are arranged into six classes 
which describe different agri-food safety purposes (Table 2): (1) Disease 
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prevention measures; (2) requirements for microbiological testing for zoonoses; (3) 
tolerance limits for residues and contaminants; (4) production process 
requirements; (5) conformity assessment and information requirements; and (6) 
requirements for handling meat after slaughtering. As Table 2 shows each trade 
flow is on average regulated by nine regulatory instruments. The 29 instruments 
are additionally assigned to one or more of four different policy goals that are part 
of the mandatory national WTO notifications: Food safety; animal health; plant 
protection; and protection of humans from animal/plant pests or diseases.
Regulatory measures are treated as being imposed in a given year if the date of 
entry into force, adoption, or notification (depending on data availability) is in the 
first half of the year; otherwise, it is assumed that the measures take effect in the 
following year. All regulatory measures within the classes (2) to (6) are assumed to 
be in effect permanently from the year when they were imposed. Regulations on 
(1) disease prevention measures are assumed to be in force from the year they were 
imposed through the following year allowing for the improvement of the countries’ 
disease status.
Overview of the number of measures
Regulatory measures have to be distinguished by their scope of application.16
Within the compilation of the data base, only measures that apply to foreign 
countries are considered given that no indication of the measures’ relevance for 
domestic producers is provided in the notifications. It is distinguished between 
regulations that are equally applied to imports from all origins, i.e. that are uniform 
across all exporters, and measures that are only targeted to specific origins, i.e. that 
are considered to be bilateral.
16 See e.g. Josling et al. 2004 (page 18) for a classification scheme of measures.
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Table 2 Regulatory instruments and their trade policy goals
Food 
safety
Animal 
healht
Plant 
protec- 
tion
Protect humans from 
animal/plant pest or 
disease
Pest/disease status x x x
Quarantine x
Regionalization x
E. coli x x
Listeria monocytogens x x
Salmonella x x
Dioxin x
Food additives x x
Pesticides x x x
Drugs x x
Other toxins x
Retained water content x
GMO/biotechnology x x
Hormones x
Other production processes x
Certification x x
Control, inspect., approval procedures x
HACCP x
International standards/harmoniz. x
Labelling x
Traceability/registration x x x
Risk assessment x
Sanitary requirem. in meat establishments x
Irradiation x
Meat/bone separation x x
Packaging x
Storage x
TBT x
Transportation x
Number of counts 102597 17624 24193 36867
Requirements for handling meat after slaughtering
Requirements for microbiological testing
Disease prevention measures
Tolerance limits for residues and contaminants
Production process requirements 
Conformity assessment and information requirements
Source: Authors’ compilation.
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Table 3 Number of measures per regulatory class 
No of measures  applied Dise Micr Tole Proc Conf Hand
Equal across  all exporters 594 163 1006 413 757 335
Bilateral measures         418 64 36 169 202 46
Total 1012 227 1042 582 959 381
Note: Dise = disease prevention measure; micr = requirements for microbiological testing; tole = tolerance 
limits for residues; proc = production process requirements; conf = conformity assessment; hand = handling meat 
after slaughtering.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
In the data base, in total 4203 regulatory measures are imposed on meat trade over 
the observation period 1996-2007. Those ten importing (Canada, China, EU15, 
Hong Kong, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the US) 
and ten exporting (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, EU15, Hong Kong, 
New Zealand, Poland, and the US) countries which have the highest average 
aggregated meat trade flow in value terms over the sample period are included in 
the analysis. Out of the 4203 regulations, around 1000 measure relate to issues of 
disease prevention, tolerance limit requirements and conformity assessment, 
respectively (Table 3).
Figure 1 Number of regulatory instruments, uniform and bilateral
Note: The names of the regulatory instruments refer to the first four letters of each regulatory instrument as
presented in Table 2.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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The regulatory instruments used in each class are presented in Figure 1
differentiated for uniform and bilateral measures. The figure shows that most 
policies target pesticide residue levels in meat and pest/disease status notification. 
The number of uniform measures across all exporters is with around 3200 
measures four times as high as the number of measures that are bilateral with 
around 900 (Figure 1 and Table 4). Under these bilateral regulations, the number of 
disease prevention measures stands out. This is reasonable given that risk of 
disease transmission is usually restricted to regional areas. Disaggregating the meat 
aggregate HS 02 into the ten subcategories as given by the HS classification, Table 
4 displays that the measures are rather evenly distributed across the HS subgroups. 
With a slight margin, measures relevant for fresh and frozen bovine meat (HS 0201 
and HS 0202) lead before measures applied to pork (HS 0203) and poultry meat
(HS 0207).
Table 4 Number of measures per HS 02 subcategory 
HS  code 0201 0202 0203 0204 0205 0206 0207 0208 0209 0210
Eq. acros s  exp. 455 432 362 358 306 325 345 201 237 247
Bilat. measures 169 148 103 98 66 80 99 40 69 63
Total 624 580 465 456 372 405 444 241 306 310
Note: 0201 = meat of bovine animals, fresh or chilled; 0201 = meat of bovine animals, frozen; 0203 = meat of 
swine, fresh, chilled or frozen; 0204 = meat of sheep or goats, fresh, chilled or frozen; 0205 = meat of horse, ass, 
etc., fresh, chilled or frozen; 0206 = edible offal of domestic animals; 0207 = meat and edible offal of poultry, 
fresh, chilled or frozen; 0208 = meat and edible offal nes., fresh, chilled or frozen; 0209 = pig and poultry fat, 
unrendered; 0210 = salted, dried or smoked meat or offal.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Measures which are uniform across all exporting countries
The EU and the US, followed by China and Korea, apply the upmost number of 
uniform sanitary regulations to the importation of meat (Figure 2 and Table 5). A 
disaggregation of the classes into single regulatory instruments is shown in Table 5
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Figure 2 Number of uniform measures in each class per importer
Note: Dise = disease prevention measures; micr = requirements for microbiological testing; tole = tolerance 
limits for residues; proc = production process requirements; conf = conformity assessment; hand = handling meat 
after slaughtering.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
for each country. For the EU and to a lower extent also for the US, it is noticeable 
that most of the regulations are applied in the area of tolerance limits. Within the 
class of tolerance limits, basically all measures relate to residue limits of pesticides
in meat. In contrast to the highly regulated US and EU import markets, Hong Kong 
(25) and Saudi Arabia (4) meat imports face the fewest SPS regulation (Table 6).
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Table 5 Number of uniform regulatory instruments per importer
Class
Regulatory 
ins trument USA CAN CHN EU15 HKG JPN KOR RUS SAU MEX
dise s tat 97 61 115 62 8 41 57 43
quar 66 2 16 10
regi 7 2 2 2 3
micr ecol 5 19 9 20
lis t 11 19 9 10
salm 5 26 10 20
tole diox 2 10 35 14 4
fadd 33 23 10 4 40
drug 10 10 101 6
pes t 229 43 289 87
otox 31 5 12
wate 7 1
prod GM O 50 76 10 10
horm 102
opro 10 46 7 1 80 11 10
conf cert 2 3 16 20 32
insp 53 46 63 83 2 10 4 10
HA CCP 48 1 1 17 10
harm 7 20 10 2
labe 49 5 10 3 3 10 66
trac 14 10 19
risk 3 32 42
rmea 16 15
hand irra 42 1 10 4
msep 2
pack 15 21 10 13 15
s tor 17 1 7 6 15
tech 31 7 15 10 30
tran 7 2 18 6 15 15
SUM 704 245 547 809 25 267 422 85 4 160
Note:The name of the regulatory instruments refers to the first four letters of each regulatory instrument as 
presented in Table 2.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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Table 6 Number of uniform measures per importer
Countries USA CAN CHN EU15 HKG JPN KOR RUS SAU MEX
No of measures 704 245 547 809 25 267 422 85 4 160
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Finally, in Table 7 and Figure 3 the number of measures in each class is presented 
differentiated by the date of initiation. Two observations can be made: Starting 
with the year 2001, the number of newly initiated measures nearly doubled 
compared to the first years after the SPS Agreement entered into force in 1995. 
Second, in the years 2001 and 2002 an increased number of notifications related to
the class of disease prevention measures (131 and 203, respectively) can be noted.
Table 7 Development of number of uniform measures, 1996-2007
Years 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
No of measures 122 113 145 174 139 294 652 384 322 361 243 319
Source: Authors’ calculation.
In 2001, most of these notifications result from the US (28), Canada (19), Korea 
(29), and Mexico (30), whereas in the year 2002, 165 out of 203 notifications result
exclusively from China. This huge number can be explained by China’s WTO 
accession. Also conformity assessment and information requirement regulations 
have a peak in 2002. Again, China implements the most new measures (105).
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Figure 3 Number of uniform measures in each class applied by importing 
countries differentiated by year of initiation
Note: Dise = disease prevention measures; micr = requirements for microbiological testing; tole = tolerance 
limits for residues; proc = production process requirements; conf = conformity assessment; hand = handling meat 
after slaughtering.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Bilateral measures
China and the EU, followed by the US, have implemented by far the most bilateral 
measures across the sample (Table 8). For China and the US, disease and pest 
prevention regulations rank first. For the EU, the highest number of bilateral 
measures is located in the areas of production processing requirements and 
conformity assessment regulations. Focusing on the bilateral trade partnerships, 
Table 9 depicts that most of the US measures are targeted towards the EU. China 
targets US and EU imports nearly to the same extent. 
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Table 8 Number of bilateral measures implemented by importing countries
USA CAN CHN EU15 HKG JPN KOR RUS MEX
dise 99 50 123 24 8 26 44 44
micr 64
tole 2 20 14
proc 169
conf 16 5 34 102 2 35 6 2
hand 23 1 10 12
SUM 117 55 264 296 22 38 91 6 46
Note: Dise = disease prevention measures; micr = requirements for microbiological testing; tole = tolerance 
limits for residues; proc = production process requirements; conf = conformity assessment; hand = handling meat 
after slaughtering.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Countries exporting to the EU seem to be rather uniformly affected by European
bilateral import regulation, at which Australia, Canada, and the US still face the 
highest number of regulations. Here, most of the bilateral measures focus on
regulations related to the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), 
biotechnology, and hormones.
Table 9 Number of bilateral SPS measures per country-pair
USA CAN CHN EU15 HKG JPN KOR RUS MEX
USA n.p. 14 112 73 3 20 3
ARG 16 7 8 42 10 2 10
AUS 10 59 13
BRA 2 10 13 4
CAN 4 n.p. 8 63 2 1 20 3
CHN 23 7 6
EU15 97 30 99 n.p. 20 17 21 20
HKG 15 3 n.p.
NZL 1 20 9
POL 2 1 2 10
Note: Rows = exporters; columns = importers; n.p. = not provided.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
3.2.2 Other model data
HS 4-digit data on trade in meat products originates from the UNCTAD Comtrade 
database (UNCTAD 2009a) for the years 1996 to 2007.
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Table 10 Mean and variance of model variables
Variable Mean Variance
Trade value/10,000,000 2.08 86.07
ln production exporter 22.54 2.72
ln consumption importer 22.54 2.03
ln dis tance 9.01 0.45
Tariff 4.20 251.82
Aggregate of regulations 9.10 186.69
Disease prevention measures 0.36 1.16
Pes t/disease s tatus 0.26 0.62
Quarantine 0.10 0.21
Regionalization 0.01 0.01
Requirements  for microbiological tes ting 0.36 1.30
E. coli 0.10 0.15
Lis teria monocytogens 0.12 0.14
Salmonella 0.14 0.21
Tolerance limits  for res idues  and contaminants 3.42 52.10
Dioxin 0.17 0.46
Food additives 0.39 0.81
Pes ticides 0.22 0.67
Drugs 0.48 2.24
Other toxins 2.12 35.33
Retained water content 0.03 0.03
Production process  requirements 1.06 3.67
GM O/biotechnology 0.32 1.20
Hormones 0.59 1.92
Other production processes 0.14 0.34
Conformity as ses sment and information requirements 2.62 15.80
Certification 0.30 0.43
Inspection and approval procedure 0.83 1.90
HACCP 0.45 1.86
Harmonization 0.19 0.20
Labeling 0.37 0.77
Traceability 0.09 0.12
Risk as ses sment 0.17 0.40
Sanitary requirements  for meat es tablishments 0.22 0.42
Requirements  for handling meat after s laughtering 1.29 4.90
Irradiation 0.31 0.76
M eat/bone separation 0.01 0.02
Packaging 0.21 0.27
Storage 0.19 0.22
Technical barriers  to trade 0.32 0.58
Transportation 0.26 0.30
Food safety 9.00 184.48
Animal health 1.55 6.38
Plant health 2.12 35.33
Protect humans  from animal/plant pes ts  or diseases 3.23 51.77
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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Zero trade flows between country-pairs are included. Consumption of domestic 
meat is not considered. Altogether, there are n=11400 observations on trade flows17
of which 51 percent are non-zero. Mean and variance of the trade flow and 
explanatory variables are depicted in Table 10.
Meat production and consumption quantities result from the Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO) statistical webpage (FAO 2009) and from the 
webpage of Indexmundi (2009). Bilateral data on the explanatory variable 
geographic distance originates from the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et 
d'Informations Internationales homepage (CEPII 2009). Weighted distance is 
chosen as the distance variable, where the EU15 is centered on Germany. A time 
dummy variable is included. Tariff data stems from UNCTAD TRAINS database 
(UNCTAD 2009b). If available, the bilateral effectively applied tariff is chosen; 
otherwise, the most-favored-nations tariff is incorporated.
3.3 Results and specification tests
Table 11 presents outcomes of four different models estimated by PPML.18 The 
common base of the four models is the exponential regression function (23). The 
models differ with respect to the differentiation of regulatory measures kk ijt
k
rβ∑ .
The model named ‘aggregate’ in the first column of Table 11 includes one 
overall measure of regulatory instruments being the sum of all counts for a 
particular country-pair and HS-line within one year. The model ‘classes’ in the 
second column of Table 11 includes the six pre-defined classes of regulatory 
measures. The third column presents parameter estimates for the ‘instruments’
model, which captures the individual 29 specific regulatory measures. The 
parameter estimates of the ‘goals’ model are presented in the fourth column, which 
17 (95 country-pairs) * (12 years) * (10 HS 4-digit codes).
18 Technically, GAUSS 9.0 is used to solve the optimization problem in conjunction with the 
application module Constrained Optimization. The code is available upon request.
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considers regulatory measures aggregated by the four safety objectives listed 
above. All models are tested on independence of the conditional mean from the 
explanatory variables (Wald-test) and on the correct specification of the functional 
form of the conditional mean expectation (Ramsey’s regression equation 
specification error test (RESET)). The tests are carried out using standard errors 
that are robust to distributional misspecifications imposed by restrictions of the 
Poisson assumption (Wooldridge 1999). 
The Wald-test rejects the hypothesis that the conditional mean is independent of 
the explanatory variables for all four models. The heteroscedasticity-robust RESET 
tests the null hypothesis that the additional regressors ( )2ˆxβ and ( )3ˆxβ do not 
help to explain the dependent variable by using the auxiliary regression
( ) ( )( )2 31 2ˆ ˆexp ;M x x xβ δ β δ β= + + (24)
thus 1δ and 2δ are not significantly different from zero (Silva and Tenreyro 2006, 
Wooldridge 1999). The test suggests a correct specification of the three models 
‘aggregate’, ‘classes’, and ‘goals’, but fails for the ‘instruments’ model. The 
parameter estimates of the four traditional gravity explanatory variables are rather 
similar in the four models with the exception that the estimates of economic size of 
exporter and importer diverge in the ‘instruments’ model. The outcomes are all 
significant at the 1% significance level. The signs of the covariates’ economic size 
and geographic distance are as expected: Distance negatively affects trade, while 
the economic size fosters trade flows. The slightly positive tariff coefficient’s 
estimate of ( )exp 0.01 1.01≈ suggests a minor influence of tariffs on today’s 
meat trade. 
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Table 11 Parameter estimates of model variants
Variable Aggregate Classes Ins truments Goals
ln production exporter 1.526*** 1.736*** 3.425*** 1.653***
ln consumption importer 1.678*** 1.986*** 4.156*** 1.804***
ln dis tance -0.931*** -0.964*** -1.063*** -0.967***
Tariff 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009***
A ggregate of regulatory measures 0.015***
Disease prevention measures 0.122***
Pes t/disease s tatus 0.096
Quarantine 0.200
Regionalization -0.153
Requ. for microbiological tes ting 0.087
E.coli -0.092
Lis teria monocytogens -0.573
Salmonella 0.760***
Tolerance limits  for res idues 0.015**
Dioxin 0.416***
Food additives -0.102
Pes ticides -0.067***
Drugs 0.200***
Other toxins -0.456***
Retained water content 0.597
Production process  requirements -0.091***
GM O/biotechnology 0.030
Hormones -0.447**
Other production processes -0.146**
Conformity as ses sment 0.050**
Certification 0.018
Inspection/approval proced. 0.449***
HA CCP 0.360***
Harmonization 0.267
Labeling 0.007
Traceability 0.161
Risk as ses sment -0.639
Requ. for meat es tablishm. -0.869***
Handling meat after s laught. -0.128**
Irradiation -0.662***
M eat/bone separation -0.412
Packaging 0.117
Storage -0.060
Technical barriers  to trade 0.192
Transportation 0.879***
Food safety 0.012
A nimal health 0.080***
Plant protection 0.016
Protect humans -0.010
W ald tes t r.*** r.*** r.*** r.***
RESET n.r.*** n.r.*** r.*** n.r.***
Note: (**) and (***) denote significance at 5% and 1% level; r. = rejected; n.r. = not rejected. 
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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However, this result has to be read with caution since no distinction between 
imports under preferential tariff rate quotas and imports under tariffs has been 
made. The first column of Table 11 additionally reports the estimate for the 
aggregate regulatory instruments variable. The estimate’s value of 
( )exp 0.015 1.015≈ affirms the ambiguous impact of regulatory measures on 
trade: Regulations may be trade-restricting or trade-facilitating or may have no 
trade impact at all – a strong tendency cannot be determined from the result of the 
aggregate variable. The more disaggregated classes model gives first evidence on 
the differing implied trade effects of regulatory measures. Five of the six estimates 
are significant. Whereas the classes (1) disease prevention measures, (3) tolerance 
limits for residues and contaminants, and (5) conformity assessment and 
information requirements are trade-promoting, the trade impact of the classes (4) 
production process requirements and (6) requirements for handling meat after 
slaughtering is negative.
The third column of Table 11 goes further into the analysis and presents the 
specific regulatory instruments’ influence on trade. For example the negative 
impact of the class (4) production process requirements is caused by measures 
regulating the application of hormones and by other production processes, while 
the impact of regulations on GMOs and biotechnology is not significant. The 
fourth column of Table 11 shows that only animal health is significant among the 
policy objectives potentially underlying the regulations. The corresponding 
parameter estimate of ( )exp 0.080 confirms the necessity of measures providing a 
good animal health status for an active global trade in meat.
3.4 Conclusion of the chapter
Using a non-linear panel data gravity model, this article analyzes the trade effects 
of different regulatory measures that are imposed in the meat sector in order to 
achieve a desired national level of SPS health. The dataset used is specifically 
compiled for this study and is new and unique with respect to the detail of 
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information on the applied sector specific national regulatory instruments and with 
respect to the applied classification of measures into SPS areas and political 
objectives they serve.
The disaggregated analysis of the trade effects of regulatory instruments reveals 
the theoretically well-known ambiguous trade impact of many of these measures. 
At the class level we find that regulations imposed to achieve a desired level of 
SPS health differ in their implied trade impact. The even further disaggregated 
estimation at the level of the single regulation shows that there are specific 
measures which have a substantial positive impact and others with a significant 
negative one. These effects can offset each other within a class. When grouping the 
regulations according to underlying policy goals, policy measures ensuring animal 
health are identified as being significantly trade-enhancing. These results add more 
detail to the findings of recent research by Disdier et al. (2008a), who estimate an 
overall negative impact of SPS and TBT measures on meat trade using a log-linear 
fixed effects gravity model with HS 2-digit data.
Limitations that apply to this chapter result from the fact that a frequency count 
is used to characterize the importance of the measures. This does not allow a 
comparison of the SPS safety level achieved by a specific measure to the trade 
restriction that it imposes. For this, more theoretical work on how to compare and 
quantify the potential SPS safety levels that are achievable with single measures or 
sets of measures is necessary.
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4 Determining the welfare impact of regulatory 
measures
Simulation models have routinely been used in the applied trade analysis of 
regulatory measures in the last decade. They are firmly rooted in microeconomic 
theory and thus are appropriate tools for a systematic and economically sound 
analysis. They are able to show the trade-off between negative and positive effects 
of regulatory measures. Employing common welfare indicators, simulation analysis 
sheds light on the measures’ welfare and distributional implications, thus going 
beyond results of econometric trade models concentrating on pure trade effects.
For quantitatively determining the welfare impact of regulatory measures in a 
trade context most often spatial partial equilibrium models are applied in the 
literature. They are partial as not the whole economy is represented, but only a 
specific sector or product chain. A partial equilibrium approach allows for the 
representation of a sector or even a single product in question at considerable 
detail, but comes at the cost of insight of the effect of shocks on the overall 
economy and its feedback. If the sector or the single product represents only a 
small fraction of the overall economy, the effects on the overall economy and thus 
the feedback effects on the sector or the product chain can be neglected. This thesis 
focuses on the analysis of regulatory measures in the meat sector, and the second 
case study being discussed in chapter five just zooms in on poultry meat, analyzing 
avian influenza-related regulatory policies on poultry meat trade and welfare. Thus,
only a small sector of the overall economy is considered favoring the use of a 
partial instead of a general equilibrium model.
Simulation models allow analyzing changes of regulatory measures, whereby 
scenarios often refer to the removal of possible trade barriers. Functional equations 
describing costs and benefits of regulations are introduced into the model, and the 
simulation exercise subsequently models the producer and consumer behavior in 
response to changing regulatory requirements. Sensitivity analysis helps to check 
the robustness of the models’ results. As governments are generally not able to 
Determining the welfare impact of regulatory measures
61
generate tariffs or other revenues from regulatory measures, and thus modifications 
in regulations typically do not affect government revenues, a change in government 
welfare is not considered. 
The way regulatory measures are depicted in simulation models crucially 
determines the simulation results. Rau (2010) elaborates on the methods commonly 
applied to incorporating regulatory measures in simulation models and discusses 
the practicability and challenges of their application. On the supply side, simulation 
models usually depict regulatory measures as additional cost parameter that 
producers incur when complying with the respective requirements. The costs are 
modeled as iceberg tariffs (Samuelson 1952, Krugman 1991). Starting with 
Paarlberg and Lee (1998), papers following the risk-based approach additionally 
capture producers’ benefits associated with regulatory measures. These papers take 
into account the risk-reducing character of some regulatory measures, for instance 
regulations minimizing the probability of introducing diseases or invasive species 
that may threaten domestic production. On the demand side, regulations are 
reflected by consumers’ willingness to pay for certain product characteristics which 
are provided by regulatory measures and by consumers’ perceptions of the product 
attribute. Beghin et al. (2009) provide an extensive overview on recent methods to 
determine the consumers’ willingness to pay and how to appropriately depict the 
consumers’ behavior in face of regulatory measures. 
This chapter sets up the methodological approach being used in the second part 
of the case study presented in chapter five which analyzes trade and welfare effects 
of avian influenza-related policy measures. The chapter first discusses the 
economic specification of simulation models appropriate for simulating the 
distributional and welfare effects of regulatory measures. Then it summarizes the 
different options of incorporating costs and benefits of regulatory measures into the 
simulation model’s supply and demand functions. The last section concludes.
Determining the welfare impact of regulatory measures
62
4.1 Economic specification: Takayama-Judge versus
Armington
In general there are two economic frameworks for modeling bilateral trade in 
simulation models: (1) The Armington approach and (2) the Takayama-Judge 
approach.
The Armington approach is based on a theory of demand distinguishing 
products by their origin (Armington 1969). Consumers show a different 
willingness to pay for the same commodity depending on its place of origin, thus 
prices do not necessarily equalize across countries. The Armington approach can 
be used with a variety of functional forms for aggregating the utility of goods from 
different origins. The most common functional form is the CES utility function. Its 
main advantage is its limited data requirement, only asking for an estimate of (or 
an assumption on) one single substitution elasticity in addition to trade flow and 
price data. The Armington approach, however, comes along with some weaknesses 
in regard to applied agricultural trade modeling. Changes induced through shocks
such as policy changes will always take place only in relation to the existing 
market share. That means a country with a small share in an import market cannot 
significantly expand its exports unless the elasticity of substitution is arbitrarily set 
to high values. Another problem is that (near) zero trade flows remain (near) zero 
even after strong price changes. This so-called small shares problem arises because 
producer and consumer incentive prices are calculated as volume weighted shares 
of prices for domestic and imported goods. If trade volumes in the base period are 
(close to) zero, e.g. due to (nearly) prohibitive trade barriers, such trade-weighted 
averages of prices will not fully reflect the size of the impact of reduced trade 
barriers. That means CES-based Armington models tend to understate the trade 
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creation effect following significant reductions of trade barriers if initial trade 
flows are small or zero.19
The Takayama-Judge model goes back to Enke (1951), Samuelson (1952) and 
Takayama and Judge (1964). Trade flows are driven by transport cost 
minimization. The behavioral equations for supply and demand are formulated and 
calibrated to recover observed quantities at given prices. The model assumes 
homogenous goods and is able to display the products’ origins and destinations. It 
is appropriate to display a competitive economic environment which contains some 
regions and some discrete time periods. Bilateral trade is possible between all pairs 
of countries and time periods, where trade causes certain per unit transportation 
costs. Trade flows and quantities produced and demanded are rendered which 
satisfy the equilibrium condition of equalizing prices (including transport costs 
which may include expenses associated with import requirements) in the importing 
countries with those in the exporting countries. The poultry meat case study in 
chapter five applies a Takayama-Judge model. It is a good choice as for a product 
like poultry meat which is widely traded globally the product’s origin is not a 
major determinant for consumers’ purchase decisions.20 The model follows the 
design of a spatial multi-commodity model for homogenous products and allows 
for a highly disaggregated commodity specification in conjunction with bilateral 
trade policy measures. This is necessary as poultry meat is not only differentiated 
by its processing stage but also according to the exporter’s disease status and the 
resulting different policy responses. Additionally, drawbacks associated with the 
weaknesses of the Armington approach can be circumvented without extensive 
data and functional adjustments.
19 Structural solutions dealing with the small shares problem incorporate first the adjustment of the 
functional form (Kuiper and van Tongeren 2006, Witzke et al. 2005, Tchamourliyski 2002), and 
second the change of the whole utility function (Yue and Beghin 2009, Phaneuf et al. 2000, Wales 
and Woodland 1983). In both cases the distinction of goods by origin is maintained.
20 The argument of assuming poultry meat to be homogenous is amplified through the increasing 
share of consumption of convenience products on total poultry meat consumption.
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4.2 Economic application: Including costs and benefits of 
regulations
This section specifies demand and supply systems which can generally be used 
under a Takayama-Judge framework. Furthermore, the section discusses the 
inclusion of costs and benefits of regulatory measures, especially those being 
related to the protection of domestic agri-food production from biohazards.
4.2.1 Supply side: Modeling costs and benefits of regulations
Tariff equivalents (Yue and Beghin 2009, Yue et al. 2006) or iceberg tariffs 
(Krugman 1991, Samuelson 1952) are commonly used to model the costs of 
compliance with NTMs on the supply side of simulation models. When analyzing 
NTMs related to the protection of agri-food production from biohazards the risk-
based approach has a long history in literature. Pioneering research by Paarlberg 
and Lee (1998) was amplified through spatial coverage (Jansson et al. 2005), 
linkages to dynamic herd-size models (Niemi and Lehtonen 2011, Nogueira et al. 
2011, Mangen and Burrell 2003), and richness in model and disease parameter 
specification (Peterson and Orden 2008, Wilson and Antón 2006, Yue et al. 2006).
Peterson and Orden (2008), for instance, employ a constant elasticity of 
transformation frontier and linear supply function which allows producers to shift 
sales between seasons as relative prices change. Their domestic revenue function is
dependent on the producer prices in two consecutive time periods, the level of 
factors employed, the expected per-unit cost of measures to control the specific 
product attributes, and the expected disease-related domestic productivity loss
( )j j jN shareInf pl⋅ ⋅ , where jN is the frequency of a disease outbreak in 
importing country j , jshareInf is the share of affected domestic production by 
the disease, and jpl is the disease-related proportion reduction in productivity. 
The frequency of disease outbreaks jN is a function of the level of imports. The 
Determining the welfare impact of regulatory measures
65
foreign revenue function additionally depends on compliance costs for possible 
exporters to meet the importing country’s regulations; compliance costs are a 
function of sanitation and disease survey costs, which were obtained through field 
research.
In the analysis of regulatory measures their benefits need also be accounted for
when modeling the supply side. The benefits relating to productivity gains and
reduced transaction and information costs are ideally considered in the 
approximation of the compliance costs such that the net cost increase for exporters 
is used in the simulation model. Additionally, producers in the importing country 
clearly benefit from import regulations that reduce risks related to biohazards. For 
example, in the case of the implementation of an import requirement downsizing 
the probability of the transmission of a disease through trade, the welfare loss due 
to restricted trade can be offset by avoiding domestic production losses that would 
prevail elsewise. In this case ( )0j j jN shareInf pl⋅ ⋅ is the expected domestic 
disease-related productivity loss when safety regulations are absent, where 0jN is 
the frequency of a disease outbreak in period 0 . Instead, ( )1j j jN shareInf pl⋅ ⋅ is 
the expected domestic producers’ productivity loss when safety measures are 
implemented, where 1jN is the frequency of a disease outbreak in period 1 when 
safety measures are implemented. By intuition, 1 0j jN N< , and it can clearly be 
seen that
( ) ( )1 0 ,j j j j j jN shareInf pl N shareInf pl⋅ ⋅ < ⋅ ⋅ (25)
proving that domestic producers benefit from implementing measures preventing 
the dispersion of the disease. In the evaluation of the whole welfare effect of such a 
policy measure, the benefits are faced with foreign producer or exporter costs 
which are caused by the regulatory measures possibly restricting trade. Thus, such 
Determining the welfare impact of regulatory measures
66
risk-based analysis can be used to investigate the optimal policy response that 
maximizes overall welfare. Peterson and Orden (2008), for example, calculate the 
optimal level of food safety regulation for US imports of Mexican avocados 
accounting for the probabilities of pest infestation (fruit fly) and the costs for US 
producers (costs to prevent production losses) as well as for Mexican exporters 
(compliance costs).
The risk-based analysis of regulations crucially relies on scientific information 
on the probability of an outbreak and the spread of diseases or pests. This 
combination of natural sciences and economic modeling is promising, but also 
poses major challenges given the considerable uncertainty about the risks and their 
economic consequences. In the literature, several case studies applying partial 
equilibrium models conduct risk-based analyses of import regulations; important 
recent contributions to this topic are Disdier and Marette (2010), Yue and Beghin 
(2009), Peterson and Orden (2008), Wilson and Antón (2006), and Yue et al. 
(2006).
4.2.2 Demand side: Modeling costs and benefits of regulations
Whether the demand side is directly affected by a regulatory measure depends on 
the consumers’ awareness relative to a specific product characteristic regulated by 
the NTM and their preferences regarding this charcteristic. If consumers are aware 
of a specific product characteristic which reduces their utility, they will negatively 
internalize the expected damage linked to the characteristic in their consumption. 
Polinsky and Rogerson (1983) call this condition the rule of “no liability”, meaning 
consumers take over their own losses causing the demand curve to shift down by 
the consumers’ perceived expected losses. If a product characteristic is considered 
to affect consumers’ utility positively, consumers incur their own profits and 
demand is shifted up by their perceived profits.
To distinguish consumers with preferences for a specific product characteristic 
from those who do not have a preference, Paarlberg et al. (2008) include a vector 
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of parameters 0 1jβ≤ ≤ into the demand function indicating the share of the 
population having preferences with respect to certain product attributes:
( ),ijm f x β= , where ijm is country j ’s demand for the product of country i , x
is a vector of explanatory variables explaining preferences for attributes of each 
ijm , and ( ).f is any functional form describing this trade relationship. If 1β = , 
demand is not affected by the product attribute, whereas if 0β = , consumers’ 
preferences are prohibitive, meaning consumption falls to zero. Beghin et al. 
(2009) extend this train of thought. They employ a non-homothetic quasi-linear 
utility function that includes quadratic preferences for the market good of interest: 
( ) *max , ,ij j ij ijU m z m r m zϑ= − + (26)
where 
2
*
2
ij
ij ij
m
m m= − is the immediate satisfaction of consumers in country j
from consuming a quantity of good ijm , and z is the numeraire good. Parameter
jϑ represents the knowledge regarding a product characteristic. If consumers are 
not aware of the specific characteristic, 0jϑ = . If 1jϑ = , consumers are aware of 
the product attribute and they reduce their consumption. The perceived expected 
losses associated with the consumption of the good with a specific characteristic is 
denoted ij ijr m , where ijr is the per-unit damage. Aggregate demand for good ijm is 
obtained by summing individual demand functions over all N consumers. 
Including Paarlberg’s et al. (2003) concept of share of consumers having 
preferences with regard to specific product attributes, demand functions for two 
subgroups of consumers can be formulated and aggregated. Parameter jβ is then 
the share of consumers completely indifferent with regard to a specific 
characteristic, with 0ijr = , and the remaining share ( )1 jβ− is reluctant to 
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consume the specific product attribute and associates a damage per unit consumed, 
thus 0ijr > . The partition of consumers into the respective group (1) having a 
preference with regard to a specific characteristic and (2) not having this preference 
is done by willingness-to-pay analysis, or assumptions are made based on 
reasonable argumentation.21
4.3 Conclusion of the chapter
Spatial partial equilibrium models are an appropriate tool to analyze welfare effects 
of regulatory measures. They allow including functional equations describing costs 
and benefits into the model, and the simulation exercise models the producer and 
consumer behavior in response to changing requirements.
The Takayama-Judge approach is appropriate to model a competitive economic 
environment containing different regions and discrete time periods. The model 
follows the design of a spatial multi-commodity model for homogenous products. 
It allows for a highly disaggregated commodity specification. This is a necessary 
condition as the case study in chapter 5 analyzes meat trade flows differentiated by 
processing stage and according to the exporters’ disease status.
When formulating demand and supply equations, in both cases the effects of 
costs and benefits associated with regulatory measures have to be taken into 
account. On the supply side, the introduction of policy measures regulating the 
threat associated with biohazards impacts the supply function considerably. 
Parameters that have to be considered in such analyses are for instance the 
frequency of disease outbreaks with and without a policy measure in place, the 
expected annual pest-related domestic productivity loss, or the expected per-unit 
cost of a measure to control the specific product attribute. Exporters are 
additionally faced with compliance costs to meet the importing countries’ 
21 Pearce et al. (2006) provide a detailed overview on methods assessing consumers’ choice 
behaviour.
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regulations. Looking at benefits of regulatory measures, those that are related to 
productivity gains and reduced transaction and information costs are ideally 
considered in the approximation of the compliance costs such that the net cost 
increase for producers is used in the equilibrium model. Those measures that are 
related to reduce the prevention of a disease outbreak in the importing country are 
taken into account in the risk-based approach, combining scientific or 
epidemiologic information about probabilities of disease outbreaks and their 
spread, and economic modeling. On the demand side, product characteristics may 
affect consumers’ utility or not. If a product characteristic is considered to affect 
consumers’ utility positively (negatively), demand is shifted up (down) by 
consumers’ perceived benefits (losses). Though, if they are not aware of the 
specific product attribute, the perceived damage or profit disappears from the 
consumers’ utility function, and the demand side is not directly affected.
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5 Impact of avian influenza-related policy measures
on poultry meat trade and welfare
Sanitary and food safety measures related to animal disease outbreaks are of high 
relevance in meat trade.22 The measures’ costs are considerable, but without these 
regulations international trade flows may be significantly lower due to lack of trust 
and information between international trading partners. However, these induced 
costs reduce competitiveness of imports compared to domestic products. That is 
especially true in poultry meat markets where many countries implemented drastic 
quarantine measures in recent years in order to reduce the perceived or actual risk 
of AI transmission across territories. When the possibility of disease transmission 
is very low or the threat to food safety is negligible, these trade impediments cause 
trade and welfare losses for exporting and importing countries and the measures
may be questioned regarding their risk adequacy. These arguments are especially 
important for AI where most transmission occurs through the migration of wild 
birds into foreign territory (Fouchier et al. 2007). Equally, the human health risk 
seems to be very low and mostly related to intensive contact with infected stock 
(WHO 2011a).
An analysis of the trade concerns raised in the SPS Committee of the WTO 
shows that import measures related to the prevention of the spread of AI were by 
far the most controversial ones in recent years (1995-2010). About 57% of all trade 
concerns focus on AI where most often the exporting country complains about the 
importing country’s NTMs to be disproportional to the associated risk and not 
based on World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) guidelines. An example is 
the concern raised by the EU about India’s import ban on European live birds, 
fresh poultry meat and meat products due to AI. The EU argued that these 
measures were disproportionate to the health risks associated with imports from the 
22 This chapter is based on the paper Wieck et al. (2012). The econometric analysis was realized by 
the second author, development of the concept of the simulation analysis as well as data work was 
done by all three authors, and the simulation model was implemented by the first and the third author.
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EU as it was free of high pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) at that time. Within 
these discussions the OIE clarified that findings of AI in wild birds and of low 
pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) should not lead to import bans (WTO 2011).
Nevertheless, China still imposed import restrictions on poultry imported from
LPAI infected areas in the US and the EU. Brazil imposed an import restriction on 
French poultry meat as to protect its own poultry population and to maintain its 
status as AI free, although only one LPAI case was detected in one region of 
France. The OIE guidelines on AI also explicitly state that heat treatment de-
activates the virus and that measures associated with AI should not be applied to 
cooked poultry meat. However, the US had suspended for many years the 
importation of cooked poultry meat from China because of the presence of HPAI
(WTO 2011). As recommended by the OIE, bans are only justified in case of 
uncooked meat originating from sources with HPAI. Producers in affected regions 
then have the possibility to shift fresh meat into cooked meat production as both 
meat categories are substitutes in the processing step.23 Further on, countries should 
follow the principle of regionalization allowing producers from non-affected 
regions within a country to maintain exports.
The objective of this case study is to analyze trade and welfare effects of 
changes in importers’ regulatory AI policies for important poultry meat exporters 
(Brazil, China, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the US) and importers 
(Russia, Japan, ROW aggregate). First, past AI-related policies over the time 
period 2000 – 2007 are evaluated in terms of their trade impact using a sample 
selection gravity model approach. Second, welfare effects arising from the different 
quarantine measures imposed in the last years are calculated using a spatial partial 
simulation model which differentiates risk and infection status of imported poultry 
meat by origin. Finally, the results from these two approaches are brought together 
23 The share of cooked poultry meat exports on total global poultry meat exports nearly doubled from 
2004 to 2006 after outbreaks of HPAI in 2003 had major negative impacts on the global poultry 
industry (Taha 2007). Overall, the share of global cooked poultry meat exports on global total poultry 
meat exports was just 12% in quantity terms and 23% in value terms in the year 2005 (UNCTAD 
2011a).
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to provide a full picture of the effects of these quarantine measures on trade and 
welfare. 
In order to account for the different AI policies that are relevant for uncooked 
and heat-treated poultry meat, we distinguish these two meat categories. Uncooked 
poultry meat is defined as to include fresh, chilled or frozen broilers, chickens, 
turkeys, ducks, geese and guinea flows sold in cuts, parts or whole birds (HS 0207) 
and cooked poultry meat covers all processed poultry products sold in preserved, 
smoked, prepared or cooked form (HS 160231, 160232, 160239).
The remainder of the case study is organized as follows. The first section, 
divided into two sub-parts, explains the gravity and the simulation model and 
describes the respective data sources. The second section contains the results of the 
two approaches and the final section concludes.
5.1 Methodology and data
This section derives methodology and presents data used in the case study. The 
first part concentrates on the gravity model of poultry meat trade, and the second 
part presents the spatial partial simulation model to assess welfare changes of 
different AI-related regulatory policies.
5.1.1 Trade flow analysis using a gravity model
In order to evaluate the impact of AI-related policy measures on trade, a Heckman-
type econometric model based on Helpman et al. (2008) extended to a SUR 
systems approach is estimated. This allows for the desired disaggregated 
commodity specification. Generally, the more disaggregated the product 
classification of the observed trade flows, the more frequently zeros are found in 
the datasets. The sample selection (or Heckman or Tobit II) model takes advantage 
of the presence of non-existent trade flows by making a selection of country-pairs 
into the ones that are trading and that are not trading with each other. Helpman et 
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al. (2008) extend that basic sample selection model by accounting for firm level 
heterogeneity. Given that poultry meat is split into two different product categories 
which are linked (e.g. via prices) to each other, the inclusion of a SUR system 
corrects for potential correlation between errors that may be present when using the 
basic sample selection approach. 
Model structure
Like in the Heckman model, the econometric model in this paper consists of two 
separately estimated equations. First, the selection equation investigates the 
decision whether to trade or not:
( ) ( )1 1 1Pr 1| , ,ijk ijk k k kh x G xρ β= = = (27)
where ijkρ is the probability that country i exports poultry meat of category 
( ) ( )1 , 2k cookedmeat uncookedmeat∈   to country j conditional on the 
vector of observed variables 1kx potentially explaining trade costs which might 
vary between the two meat categories k . The binary variable ijkh indicates
whether a trade flow from country i to country j is positive ( )1ijkh = or zero 
( )0ijkh = for the respective meat category k . The function ( ).G is designed as 
the cdf of the bivariate normal distribution and is therefore in the interval [ ]0,1 , 
and 1kβ is the vector of coefficients in the domain k . The selection equation (27)
is estimated separately for both poultry meat categories k . Following Verbeek 
(2004), the two estimated residual vectors ˆkε originating from the Probit selection 
equation (27) are both normal and identically distributed (0,1)NID and are used to 
calculate the covariance matrix 
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where 2 ,
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σ ε ε= , ( ) { }, 1, 2 ,m n ∈ with df being degrees of freedom, and 
I is the TxT identity matrix with T being the number of explanatory variables in 
1kx . The estimated covariance matrix Ωˆ is then used to calculate the SUR-
estimates 
( ) 1-1 -11 1 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ' 'SUR X X X yβ −= Ω Ω (29)
by stacking both product categories into one equation, where 1 11
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is the stacked latent variable originating from the Probit 
selection equation (27).
The second equation estimates bilateral trade quantities of poultry meat 
conditional on a positive trade flow (Helpman et al. 2008):
{ } 2 2 12| 1 ,ijk ijk k k k ijk ijk ijkE m h x uβ σ λ ω= = + + + (30)
where ijkm is the logarithmic observed trade flow from country i to country j
given that the observed trade flow ijkh is positive, and 2kx denotes a vector of 
variables potentially explaining trade costs. As in the selection equation (27), the 
estimation is done separately for both meat categories k and the unobserved errors 
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ijku are assumed to be distributed bivariate normal. The covariance 12kσ of the 
unobserved errors (or unobserved trade costs) of the selection and the trade flow 
equation is estimated as a coefficient in equation (30). Following Heckman (1979), 
Heckman’s lambda 
( )
( )
1 1
1 1
k k
ijk
k k
x
x
φ β
λ
β
=
Φ
controls for sample selection and can be 
calculated after estimating the SUR equation (29); the calculated estimate iˆjkλ
replaces ijkλ in equation (30). Helpman et al. (2008) extend the Heckman approach 
by not only controlling for sample selection through variable λ , but also 
accounting for unobserved firm level heterogeneity. 
The underlying idea is that firms differ in their productivity levels so that only 
sufficiently productive firms who are able to overcome market entry costs such as 
NTMs export. Firm level heterogeneity therefore allows accounting for the impact 
of NTMs and other country characteristics on the share of exporting firms. In this 
respect the impact of trade frictions is decomposed into its effect on the number of 
exporters and its effect on the trade volume per exporter. Thus, the additional 
parameter ( ){ }ˆˆln exp 1ijk ijk ijkzω δ λ = + −  controls for the correlation of firm 
level heterogeneity with the firms’ export decision.24 The estimate ˆijkz is the 
inverse of the cdf of the estimated probability that country i exports to country j
( )ˆijkρ and is obtained after estimation of the SUR-equation (29).25
Data
Trade data in value terms for the years 2000 – 2007 originates from the United 
Nations (UN) Comtrade database (UNCTAD 2011a). Each of the exporters
covered in the analysis potentially exports in each year both types of poultry meat 
24 See Helpman et al. (2008) equation (9) and (14).
25 Technically, GAUSS 9.0 is used to solve the optimization problem in conjunction with the 
application module Constrained Optimization. The code is available upon request.
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products to the covered importers, accounting for 288n = trade flow 
observations, of which 87.5% are nonzero. Mean and variance of the trade flow 
and explanatory variables are depicted in Table 12.
Bilateral data on the bilateral policy measures (1) ban on both meat categories, 
(2) ban on uncooked meat,26 and (3) ban on cooked and/or uncooked meat but
adhering to the principle of regionalization result from the Japanese Animal 
Quarantine Service homepage (AQS 2010) and from the Russian Ministry of 
Agriculture (2010).27 It is assumed that ROW as importer implements policy 
measures in line with the official OIE requirements, i.e. just bans for uncooked 
meat from HPAI producers according to the principle of regionalization. As Table 
12 shows, 9% of the bilateral cooked poultry meat trade relationships are faced 
with a ban and in 9% of the trade flows the principle of regionalization is applied. 
In comparison with cooked meat, trade flows of uncooked poultry meat are 
affected more often by AI-related policy measures: 16% are constrained by a ban, 
and 12% operate under the principle of regionalization.
Table 12 Mean and variance of model variables
Mean Variance Mean Variance
ln trade value/1000 [$] 9.01 10.25 11.78 4.90
ln production exporter [t] 14.05 1.57 14.93 1.56
ln consumption importer [t] 13.61 4.56 15.58 2.71
ln dis tance [km] 8.82 0.35 8.81 0.35
Ban 0.09 0.08 0.16 0.13
Principle of regionalization 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.10
Tariff 6.61 43.85 7.49 124.95
Variable
Cooked meat Uncooked meat
Source: Authors’ calculation.
26 By way of construction, policy measures (1) and (2) are combined into one explanatory variable 
“ban” in the econometric analysis.
27 The three policy options are chosen as they are addressed in the Terrestrial animal health code (OIE 
2011). Additionally, they are a matter of trade concerns raised in the SPS Committee (WTO 2011). 
Bans may be imposed for time periods less than a year. In case such a short time ban is imposed, 
nonetheless the ban dummy changes from zero to one in that year. As result, trade flows may be 
present in a particular year even though a ban is imposed.
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Data on production and consumption quantities on the aggregate poultry meat 
result from the FAO (2011) and the UN (2011), as well as from the German market 
and price information system (ZMP 2006-2008). Differing from Tinbergen (1962) 
we include sectoral production (for exporters) and consumption quantity data (for 
importers) as explanatory variables instead of the countries’ GDP, accounting for 
the sectoral analysis within this case study. An inquiry carried out by the Business 
Analytical Center (BAC 2010) delivered disaggregated production and 
consumption data for European countries differentiated by cooked and uncooked 
poultry meat. It is further used to estimate the shares for cooked and uncooked 
meat for the regions where the information is missing. This is done by a regression 
of the disaggregated production and consumption data on per capita GDP (Zhao
2011).
Bilateral data on geographic distance and common language (ethno)28 originates 
from the Centre d’Etudes Prospectivs et d’Informations Internationales homepage 
(CEPII 2010). The distance to the respective ROW import destination is calculated 
as the mean over all countries where the two explicit importers Russia and Japan 
are excluded. Tariff data stems from the UN Tariff and Trade Analysis database 
(UNCTAD 2011b). If available, the bilateral effectively applied weighted tariff is 
chosen; otherwise, the most-favored-nations tariff is included. Additionally, 
dummy variables for the observed time period and for exporter and importer-
specific fixed effects are included.
5.1.2 Welfare analysis using a spatial partial equilibrium model
Spatial partial equilibrium models analyzing NTMs related to animal health have a 
long history in the literature. Since early research as found in Paarlberg and Lee 
(1998), the spatial coverage (e.g. Jansson et al. 2005), richness in model and 
disease parameter specification (e.g. Disdier and Marette 2010, Peterson and Orden
28 The trade partners within the sample do not share a common language. However, we assume that 
the trade partners US-ROW, EU-ROW, and France-ROW use a common language, expressing the 
worldwide dispersion of the languages English and French.
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2008), and linkage to dynamic herd-size models (e.g. Niemi and Lehtonen 2011, 
Nogueira et al. 2011, Mangen and Burrell 2003), or other information related to the 
impact of specific measures has considerably amplified. A specific focus on the 
impacts of AI is found in Djunaidi and Djunaidi (2007) though they focus on the 
timing of outbreaks in different world regions, concentrate just on HPAI countries, 
and do not differentiate between cooked and uncooked poultry meat.
Model structure
The model follows the design of a spatial multi-commodity model for homogenous 
products based on the Takayama-Judge approach (Takayama and Judge 1971) 
which allows for a highly disaggregated commodity specification in conjunction 
with bilateral trade policy measures. It is able to display the products’ origins and 
destinations. Trade flows are driven by transport cost minimization. The behavioral 
equations for supply and demand are calibrated as to recover observed quantities at 
given prices, and non-linear per unit transport cost are introduced to reproduce
observed trade flows.
Poultry meat is not only differentiated by its processing stage 
(cooked/uncooked) but also according to the origin’s country disease status (AI 
free, AI low pathogenic, AI high pathogenic) in order to model the various AI 
policy measures on a disaggregated level. According to OIE (2011) guidelines, 
only for uncooked meat from high pathogenic origins a ban is an appropriate 
measure for preventing the dispersion of AI.
For the demand side, we assume that consumers are indifferent regarding the 
origin of poultry meat and thus, implicitly, also regarding the meat’s AI status. The 
latter assumption might be astonishing as one effect of the global avian influenza
outbreak a few years back was a drastic reduction of poultry meat consumption in 
the short run. However, consumers returned to earlier consumption pattern 
relatively quickly, despite the fact that herds still carried the disease. In spring 
2011, a poultry herd in Germany was culled due to an AI outbreak in wild birds in 
the neighborhood. This was widely made known via the media but a change in 
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consumption levels of cooked or uncooked poultry meat could not be observed. 
These observations let us chose a model specification where AI is treated as an 
animal disease with supply side effects, but no impact on consumer behavior (as 
e.g. in Nogueira 2011, Djunaidi and Djunaidi 2007, and Paarlberg and Lee 1998).
Supply of poultry meat and risk of infection
On the supply side, a perfectly competitive industry within each region is assumed
where regions are indexed by r . A normalized quadratic (NQ) profit function (cf. 
Lau 1978) is used to measure welfare changes for the aggregate representative 
producer and to derive supply functions for each region and poultry meat category
i and j :
* * * * *1
, , , , , , ,2 ,r r i r i r i j j i r i r i r i
i ij i
c ps bs ps ps br risk pspi = + +∑ ∑ ∑ . (31)
where rpi is the profit in region r . A general price index reflecting the price of all 
intermediate inputs and primary factors is implicitly assumed in the background for 
normalization and kept fixed at unity in simulation experiments.29 Normalized 
producer prices ,r ips for each region and meat category are used in the model and 
drive supply via the parameters c and bs . The second summation in equation (31)
reflects cross price effects. Additionally, supply is influenced by infection risk 
risk . A higher infection risk shifts the supply function to the left depending on the 
parameter br , equivalent to the assumption of marginal production costs 
increasing with the infection risk.
The derived supply functions sply are linear in (normalized) producer prices 
and risk:
29 ‘Star’ stands for normalized values. Normalization is no longer explicitly shown in the following 
equations.
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,
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,
r i
r i r i r i j j r i r i
jr i
sply c bs ps br risk
ps
pi∂
= = + +
∂ ∑ . (32)
Similar to Peterson and Orden (2008), the infection risk for a product and market is 
determined by the share of infected uncooked poultry products in the domestic 
market, either imported or from domestic sales. The variable risk is hence 
calculated from the variable flows (the off-diagonal elements represent the trade 
from region 1r to region ,r whereas the diagonal elements depict domestic sales) 
and the share of infected products shareInf of the producing region 1.r The
share is derived from the AI status of the country (see Table 13 below):
, 1, 1,
1
,
, 1,
1
.
r r i r i
r
r i
r r i
r
flows shareInf
risk
flows
=
∑
∑
(33)
According to OIE (2011), it is assumed that only uncooked meat carries an 
infection risk. Thus, equation (33) above together with the supply formulation 
implies that higher shares of infected uncooked meat in imports lead to higher 
infection rates of domestic livestock. A distinction between LPAI and HPAI 
importers is hence solely expressed by the parameter shareInf .
The disease status for each country results from the AI country classification of 
the WHO (2011b) based on AI outbreaks during the years 2000-2007 and is 
depicted in Table 13.30 We assume that the AI status of each region does not 
change over time as experience has shown that once AI is present in a region it is 
extensive and time-consuming to eradicate it (Swayne and Akey 2005).
30 Djunaidi and Djunaidi (2007) for example do not distinguish between LPAI and HPAI status and 
assume a flat 25% production loss when an outbreak occurs.
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Table 13 AI status of countries and assumption about the effect on supply
Status Countries
Assumed impact on supply
(“share of infected products”)
AI free Brazil, The Netherlands 0 %
LPAI US, Japan, ROW 2 %
HPAI Germany, France, China, Russia 5%
Source: Country classification based on WHO (2011b).
Demand of poultry meat
On the demand side, a Generalized Leontief (GL) expenditure system (Ryan and 
Wales 1999) drives demand quantities dem of the aggregate representative 
consumer depending on endogenous consumer prices pd and fixed and given 
regional income Y :
[ ],, r ii r i r r
r
Gi
dem comm Y F
G
= + − , (34)
with ,r r i i
i
F comm pd=∑ , 
,
r ij i j
i j
G bd pd pd=∑ , and 
, ,r i r r i ij i j
j
Gi G pd bd pd pd= ∂ ∂ =∑ .
The parameters comm can be interpreted as commitments, i.e. quantities 
consumed independent of prices and income, the term F being the value of the 
commitments at given demand prices pd . The non-committed income ( )Y F− is 
then distributed to the products according to the term G and its first derivative 
with respect to prices Gi as shown above. Parameter bd represents the matrix of 
coefficients to be calibrated. Symmetry is guaranteed by a symmetric bd matrix 
describing the price dependent terms. Correct curvature is assured by non-
negativity of the off-diagonal elements of bd , and adding up is automatically 
given.
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Welfare changes for consumers are based on the money metric concept (cf. Varian
1992), which is calculated for the GL demand systems as:
.
sim
sim calr
r r r r rcal
r
G
monMetr Y F Y F
G
   = − − −    (35)
Terms for the welfare change calculation must be measured in the calibrated 
benchmark point of the model cal and in the simulation run sim .
Market equilibrium
Besides the behavioral equations for supply and demand, the model further 
comprises for each market two equations which ensure first, that supply cannot 
exceed exports plus domestic sales and second, that import flows plus domestic 
sales do not fall below demand.31
, , 1, ,s ,r i r r i r i
r
sply flows p≥ ⊥∑ (36)
where , 1, , ,r r i r i r i
r
flows dem pd≥ ⊥∑ .
These trade flow equations are paired with the respective producer and consumer 
prices. Thus, the complementary slackness condition ensures that excess supply 
requires zero producer prices where excess sales let consumer prices drop to zero. 
Finally, the spatial arbitrage condition from transport cost minimization is 
added for each market. It is paired according to complementary slackness 
conditions with the transport flows implying that when a trade flow is positive, 
31 Market balances for cooked and uncooked poultry meat are displayed in Table A1 in the Appendix.
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producer price multiplied with import tariff t plus transport costs tc must be 
(larger or) equal to demand price:
( )1, 1, , 1, , , 1,1 .r i r i r r i r i r r ips t tc pd flows+ + ≥ ⊥ (37)
Per unit transport costs are a linear function of transported quantities where the 
function is specified using the parameters atc and btc :
, 1, , 1, , 1, , 1, .r r i r r i r r i r r itc atc btc flows= + (38)
Non-constant per unit transport costs are introduced in order to smooth the overall 
behavior of the model but with the disadvantage that the additional slope parameter 
introduces a rather unknown element in the model. The parameters are derived 
from the dual solution of a model forced to replicate the observed trade flows at
given prices (cf. Paris et al. 2009). However, in here we introduce additionally a 
slope term to avoid a degenerate dual solution. It is derived by assuming that per 
unit transport costs increase a certain percentage if the trade flow doubles.32
Data 
The simulation model shares as far as possible the data with the gravity estimation. 
As the reference point, averages of trade quantities, values, supply and 
consumption of the years 2000-2007 are taken. Transport costs are derived from 
the maritime transport costs data base of OECD (2011). Port-to-port shipping 
distance between trading partners is collected from the website SeaRates.com
where the “Nearest Rule” is applied when more than one port in a country exists
(SeaRates 2011). In order to come up with average transport costs from country to 
country, several steps need to be performed as outlined in Zhao (2011). Import 
32 Technically, GAMS 23.6 in conjunction with PATH 4.6 is used to solve the optimization problem. 
The code is available upon request.
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tariffs for poultry meat result from the Common Agricultural Policy Regional 
Impact (CAPRI) global multi-commodity model (Britz and Witzke 2008). 
For the data to be used in an economic simulation model, the first order conditions 
from welfare maximization must hold at the calibration point. Accordingly, similar 
to the construction of data sets for global computable general equilibrium models 
(Narayanan and Walsmley 2008), we first calculated a closed, complete and 
consistent set of quantity and price data for our products and regions in the 
simulation model based on the available raw data information. 
Model parameters and parameter uncertainty
Parameters for both the supply and demand system are chosen such as to recover 
given point elasticities of quantities and prices at the calibration point. However, 
given standard constraints from microeconomic theory, even flexible functional 
forms as the ones chosen in the model cannot recover any set of given point 
elasticities from the data. Accordingly, parameter calibration is based on constraint 
optimization which chooses the set of parameters minimizing the differences 
between point elasticities calculated from current parameters and given point 
elasticities, while calibrating the behavioral functions to given prices and quantities 
and theory consistent microeconomic constraints. Further details on the parameter 
calibration can be found in the CAPRI documentation (Britz and Witzke 2008 pp. 
92-93). The intercept of the transport cost equation is derived from the dual 
solution of the model forced to replicate the observed trade flows at given prices 
(cf. Paris et al. 2009). The slope term, introduced additionally to avoid degenerate 
dual solutions, is drawn from a uniform distribution as described below. 
For all countries, the following parameters are unknown or proxies from other 
studies: Supply and demand elasticities differentiated for cooked and uncooked 
poultry meat, impact of increased infection risk on supply, and slope parameter of 
the transport costs. We address this parameter uncertainty using Monte Carlo 
techniques following Gilbert (2003) and Abler et al. (1999). This is done by 
drawing 1000 random sets of parameter values from a uniform distribution 
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assuming that the parameters vary simultaneously and independently. Next, for 
each draw, the behavioral functions are re-calibrated against the drawn parameters 
and the model is solved. The resulting changes in quantities, prices and resulting 
welfare measures for each draw and scenario are stored and their mean values are 
calculated and reported in the end. The parameter means are assumed to be: -0.5 
for own and +0.25 for cross price demand elasticities; +1 for own and -0.5 for cross
price supply elasticities; 0.1% increase in per unit transport costs if the trade flow 
doubles as starting point for the slope of the transport cost equation (38); and a 
20% drop of production if all imports and domestic sales would be HPAI infected, 
as relevant for the risk parameter in the supply equation (32).
5.1.3 Avian influenza policy scenario definitions
Whereas the gravity approach evaluates ex-post the trade impact of import bans 
and the principle of regionalization, the spatial simulation model quantifies the 
welfare effects related to the introduction of import bans. Given the policy 
discussion about the justification of import bans, two scenarios are implemented:
1. “Drastic scenario”: Introduction of an import ban by avian influenza free
(FAI) countries for cooked and uncooked meat from HPAI and LPAI 
countries and by LPAI countries for imports from HPAI countries. 
2. “Realistic scenario”: Introduction of an import ban for uncooked meat
from HPAI countries only by FAI and LPAI countries.
The bans prevent any imports of uncooked poultry meat, as results of the 
econometric estimation (see column 3 of Table 15) indicate that past import bans 
on uncooked poultry meat were effective. Missing data at the sub-national level 
(production, consumption, trade, AI status) do not allow modeling the principle of 
regionalization.
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5.2 Results
First, results of the trade flow analysis are described, before the findings of the 
welfare analysis including the different chosen policy scenarios are presented.
5.2.1 Trade impact results using the gravity model
The following two tables present outcomes of the econometric model consisting of 
the selection equation (27) and the outcome equation (30). The SUR-estimates of 
equation (29) are not presented but are available upon request.
Selection equation
Table 14 provides the results of the selection equation (27) which present an 
intermediate output of the chosen econometric specification. Thus, results have to 
be interpreted with caution. In addition to the variables presented in Table 14, a 
time dummy variable and exporter and importer-specific fixed effects are included
in equation (27). The signs for ‘distance’ are highly negative for both meat 
categories suggesting a strong impact of transport costs or a preference of 
consumers towards domestic or nearby produced meat. The trade partners’ 
economic sizes of their poultry meat markets do not have a clear positive impact on 
the probability of bilateral trade, contrary to the prediction of gravity theory. The 
‘language’ variable has unexpectedly a negative impact for both product groups
which may be determined by the fact that only few trade partners within the sample 
share a common language (cf. footnote 28). The sign of the policy variable ‘import 
ban’ is negative, but significant only in case of uncooked meat. The difference in 
magnitude and significance can be explained through the combination of ‘ban on 
both meat categories’ and ‘ban on uncooked meat’ into one explanatory variable 
‘ban’. That means, cu un n≥ , where cun is the number of observed bans imposed 
on cooked and uncooked meat, and un is the number of observed bans just on 
uncooked meat.
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Table 14 Results of the selection equation for cooked and uncooked meat
estimated by Probit ML
Control variable Coefficient S td. error Coefficient S td. error
Production exporter -6.042 9.140 -307.437*** 8.958
Consumption importer 32.314 22.599 -642.566*** 16.685
Dis tance -61.265*** 5.234 -25.514*** 9.307
Ban -1.185 1.091 -5.698*** 0.353
Regionalization -4.775* 2.585 2.744*** 0.311
Tariff -14.437*** 4.9780 60.423*** 5.697
ComLang -17.535*** 1.177 -47.629*** 0.789
n = 144 n = 144
Cooked meat Uncooked meat
Note: (*), (**), and (***) denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
Source: Authors’ calculation.
The marginal effects of the ‘ban’ evaluated at the sample means (cf. Greene 2008 
p.775) are -0.383 for cooked and -0.490 for uncooked meat, meaning the ‘ban’
downsizes the probability of trade for a typical country pair by 38% and 49%, 
respectively. The policy variable ‘regionalization’ has an unexpected negative and 
significant trade impact in case of cooked meat (marginal effect: -0.415), whereas 
it is, as expected, significantly positive in case of uncooked meat (marginal effect: 
0.500). The result for the ‘tariff’ variable is negative in case of cooked poultry 
meat, but unexpectedly positive in case of uncooked meat.
Outcome equation
Findings of the final outcome equation (30) which is estimated by NLS due to its 
non-linear term ω are presented in Table 15. Following Helpman et al. (2008), 
‘language’ is used as excluded variable. Estimates deviate from the findings of the 
selection equation, becoming more theory consistent. In case of cooked poultry 
meat, the outcome equation yields the expected estimates for the ‘production’, 
‘consumption’ and ‘distance’ variables as can be seen in column 1. The cooked 
meat coefficients’ standard errors are presented in column 2.
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Table 15 Results of the outcome equation for cooked and uncooked meat
estimated by NLS
Control variable Coefficient S td. error Coefficient S td. error
Production exporter 14.060*** 4.440 4.420 6.541
Consumption importer 27.912*** 8.889 11.909 7.530
Dis tance -4.139*** 0.856 -2.625** 1.286
Ban 1.692*** 0.623 -6.046*** 1.710
Regionalization -0.551 0.532 3.109* 1.736
Tariff 0.393 0.720 -1.439 0.906
Omega (Firm heterogeneity) 1.127*** 0.396 0.872 0.656
Lambda (Sample selection) -3.988*** 0.910 -7.652*** 2.030
n = 126
Cooked meat Uncooked meat
Note: (*), (**), and (***) denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
The trade impact of the ‘tariff’ is not significant. The outcome of the ‘ban’ variable 
is positive, but the ‘regionalization’ variable has a negative estimation result, 
though not significant. Interpreting both variables in terms of marginal effects, a 
situation with a ban increases trade more than 5 times 
( )( )exp 1.692 5.430m M + = ⋅  in comparison to a situation without a ban, 
where m is the natural logarithm of the actual trade flow observation M . 
Obviously, shift effects from raw meat to preserved meat after establishing a ban 
play its role. Instead, implementing the ‘regionalization’ variable reduces trade by 
more than 40% in the cooked meat case. As in Helpman et al. (2008), firm level 
heterogeneity shows a positive trade impact, whereas the sample selection estimate 
is significantly negative. 
The outcome for uncooked meat presented in column 3 of Table 15 mirrors our 
expectations for the regulatory policy variables. Column 4 contains the uncooked 
meat coefficients’ standard errors. ‘Production’, ‘consumption’ and ‘distance’
variables show the expected signs, though only the ‘distance’ variable outcome is 
statistically significant. The ‘ban’ shows a negative sign whereas the 
‘regionalization’ variable is positive, both statistically significant. Interpreting the 
two policy variables, a situation with a ban reduces trade in uncooked meat by 
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nearly 100% ( )( )exp 6.046 0.002m M − = ⋅  in comparison to a situation 
without a ban. Installing the policy option ‘regionalization’ instead augments trade 
more than 22 times. Results of the variables ‘tariff’ and ‘firm level heterogeneity’
are not significant, whereas ‘sample selection’ again shows a significant negative 
trade impact. 
Summarizing, the policy variable ‘ban’ has a nearly prohibitive trade impact for 
uncooked meat whereas the ‘regionalization’ variable is trade enhancing. For 
cooked meat estimation results are inconclusive: The estimates are either 
insignificant, or have unexpected signs. This outcome might be linked to 
substantial shift effects from uncooked meat to cooked meat.
5.2.2 Welfare results using the spatial partial equilibrium model
The introduction of import bans is globally welfare decreasing in both scenarios
(Table 16).33 In both scenarios, production is slightly shifted from uncooked to 
cooked meat with associated changes in demand and prices (Table 17). On world 
level, quantity weighted average producer prices for uncooked meat decrease, also 
due to cost savings in countries with reduced infection risk, whereas consumer 
prices increase as a result of increasing average per unit trade costs due to trade 
diversion effects. Globally, exports of uncooked poultry meat are reduced whereas 
exports of cooked meat increase. Largest absolute welfare losses are recorded in 
the ROW countries which also represent the largest market with about 43% of 
world consumption. 
33 The supply side is split up into production of meat and the transport and marketing sector. The sum 
of their marginal costs determines consumer prices and consumption effects. The welfare calculation 
accounts for the effects of the three representative agents (producers, traders, consumers).
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Table 16 Mean absolute welfare changes compared to baseline (M. Euro)
Realistic scenario
AI status Sum
Money 
Metric
Transport 
costs Profits
World -224.87 -296.18 78.60 -7.29
Netherlands FAI -1.67 0.46 -0.81 -1.32
Brazil FAI -3.11 15.08 -0.11 -18.08
Germany HPAI -15.08 8.94 5.90 -29.92
France HPAI -8.91 17.35 -1.46 -24.79
China HPAI -59.06 122.25 8.58 -189.90
Russia HPAI -4.44 21.37 25.84 -51.66
USA LPAI 18.54 4.41 -1.95 16.08
Japan LPAI 15.22 -6.90 -7.10 29.22
ROW LPAI -166.36 -479.14 49.70 263.08
Drastic scenario
AI status Sum
Money
Metric
Transport 
costs Profits
World -282.16 -356.79 85.90 -11.27
Netherlands FAI -1.46 0.04 -1.42 -0.08
Brazil FAI -1.65 12.82 -0.06 -14.40
Germany HPAI -30.88 43.61 -0.01 -74.48
France HPAI -30.50 45.30 -5.44 -70.36
China HPAI -86.25 167.36 16.94 -270.55
Russia HPAI -17.33 33.82 15.18 -66.34
USA LPAI 29.71 -23.84 -2.68 56.22
Japan LPAI 28.65 -13.84 5.83 36.66
ROW LPAI -172.45 -622.06 57.56 39.04
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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Table 17 Mean supply and demand quantities and mean prices 
Realistic scenario Drastic scenario
Country
AI 
status
Type 
of meat Supply Demand Price [€/kg] Supply Demand Price [€/kg]
[1000 t] [1000 t] Producer Consumer [1000 t] [1000 t] Producer Consumer
World Uncooked  61,797.6 61,797.6 1.0 1.1 61,804.9 61,804.9 1.0 1.1
-0.2 -0.2 -0.3 0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 0.4
Cooked  12,963.3 12,963.3 2.0 2.1 12,953.1 12,953.1 2.0 2.1
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4
Netherlands FAI Uncooked  597.7 219.8 1.0 1.1 597.4 219.9 1.0 1.1
-0.3 0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 0.2 -0.3 -0.2
Cooked  78.0 49.8 1.9 2.2 78.5 49.7 1.9 2.3
0.4 -0.2 0.2 0.2 0.9 -0.3 0.7 0.5
Brazil FAI Uncooked  7,014.9 5,608.5 1.0 1.1 7,014.1 5,608.4 1.0 1.1
-0.3 0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 0.1 -0.3 -0.2
Cooked  400.5 254.3 2.0 2.2 401.8 254.0 2.0 2.2
0.3 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.6 -0.3 0.5 0.4
Germany HPAI Uncooked  665.4 1,011.9 1.0 1.1 675.9 1,004.6 1.0 1.1
-4.5 0.5 -1.1 -0.9 -3.0 -0.2 -1.2 -0.9
Cooked  222.7 251.3 1.9 2.2 206.2 259.7 1.8 2.1
0.7 -0.3 0.2 0.2 -6.8 3.0 -6.6 -5.8
France HPAI Uncooked  1,561.8 1,363.4 1.0 1.1 1,573.9 1,357.8 1.0 1.1
-1.6 0.7 -0.9 -1.2 -0.8 0.2 -1.0 -1.3
Cooked  244.4 198.1 2.0 2.2 228.1 204.8 1.9 2.1
0.6 -0.4 0.2 0.2 -6.1 3.0 -6.0 -5.8
China HPAI Uncooked  12,947.1 13,563.1 1.0 1.1 12,954.7 13,559.4 1.0 1.1
-1.4 0.4 -1.2 -0.8 -1.4 0.4 -1.3 -0.9
Cooked  356.0 272.3 2.0 2.2 330.7 281.4 1.9 2.1
0.7 -0.3 0.2 0.2 -6.5 3.0 -6.4 -5.7
Russia HPAI Uncooked  1,058.1 2,430.1 0.9 1.1 1,059.2 2,428.4 0.9 1.1
-4.9 0.4 -2.3 -0.8 -4.8 0.3 -2.4 -0.8
Cooked  66.9 78.4 1.9 2.2 62.1 81.2 1.8 2.1
1.2 -0.3 0.2 0.2 -6.1 3.3 -6.5 -6.1
USA LPAI Uncooked  14,623.3 13,387.7 1.0 1.1 14,612.4 13,391.4 1.0 1.1
0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1
Cooked  2,257.9 2,262.6 2.0 2.2 2,271.7 2,257.0 2.0 2.2
0.2 -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.8 -0.4 0.7 0.6
Japan LPAI Uncooked  995.0 1,585.2 1.0 1.1 993.7 1,586.5 1.0 1.1
2.5 -0.1 1.0 0.3 2.4 0.0 1.1 0.3
Cooked  307.5 397.0 1.9 2.2 310.1 395.4 1.9 2.3
-0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.6 -0.4 1.0 0.9
ROW LPAI Uncooked  22,334.2 22,627.9 1.0 1.1 22,323.5 22,648.4 1.0 1.1
0.9 -0.8 0.2 1.8 0.8 -0.7 0.3 1.9
Cooked  9,029.3 9,199.4 2.0 2.1 9,064.1 9,169.9 2.0 2.1
0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.6 0.9
Note: Per cent change to baseline in italic below each value. 
Source: Authors’ calculation.
Overall, in the realistic scenario, welfare losses due to the imposed trade ban for 
uncooked meat are recorded for all HPAI and FAI countries. LPAI countries show 
welfare gains with the exception of the aggregate of remaining countries (ROW). 
The welfare reductions in FAI and HPAI countries mostly result from losses in 
producer profits provoked by trade diversion effects in uncooked (Table 18) and 
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cooked meat (Table 19). As HPAI countries can no longer sell uncooked meat 
abroad, they increase domestic sales (e.g. Germany +1.7%) and trade more among 
each other (e.g. Germany to China, or China to Russia) so that FAI countries lose 
important export destinations (e.g. Brazil to Germany -70%). In HPAI countries, 
the increased pressure on domestic markets leads to lower producer and consumer 
prices for uncooked meat which induce some production reductions. At the same 
time, production and exports of cooked meat slightly increases in these countries 
whereas demand goes down as prices decrease.
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Table 18 Mean trade flows (1000 t) and per centage changes compared to 
baseline for uncooked meat
Realistic scenario
Exporter
Netherlands Brazil Germany France China Russia USA Japan ROW
Importer AI status FAI FAI HPAI HPAI HPAI HPAI LPAI LPAI LPAI
Netherlands FAI
141.5 74.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 1.5
-2.5 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 inf 0.0 inf
Brazil FAI
6.5 5,599.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.0 1.4
inf 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 inf 0.0 inf
Germany HPAI
233.1 27.8 480.7 106.6 15.1 148.5 0.2 0.0 0.0
-29.9 -70.2 1.7 -1.0 inf inf -78.0 0.0 0.0
France HPAI
1.2 0.0 3.0 1,259.7 7.4 92.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
-96.6 -99.7 inf -3.8 inf inf -100.0 0.0 -100.0
China HPAI
1.0 61.4 38.6 22.9 12,857.6 178.8 402.8 0.0 0.0
-88.5 -53.6 inf 366.8 0.2 inf -24.1 0.0 0.0
Russia HPAI
20.4 360.8 143.1 172.6 66.9 638.8 1,027.3 0.0 0.0
-73.7 -22.0 37.7 7.0 724.9 47.5 -12.5 0.0 0.0
USA LPAI
30.2 31.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12,823.8 0.1 502.6
inf inf 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -6.9
Japan LPAI
40.1 738.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 116.2 682.0 8.8
inf 11.7 -100.0 -100.0 -100.0 0.0 47.9 -9.5 inf
ROW LPAI
123.7 121.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 249.5 313.0 21,819.8
inf inf -100.0 0.0 -100.0 -100.0 inf 44.5 1.0
Drastic scenario
Exporter
Netherlands Brazil Germany France China Russia USA Japan ROW
Importer AI status FAI FAI HPAI HPAI HPAI HPAI LPAI LPAI LPAI
Netherlands FAI
143.1 76.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-1.4 3.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -100.0 0.0 -100.0
Brazil FAI
7.4 5,601.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
inf 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -100.0
Germany HPAI
222.3 24.2 482.1 110.2 16.6 148.9 0.2 0.0 0.0
-33.1 -74.0 2.0 2.4 inf inf -75.6 0.0 0.0
France HPAI
0.8 0.0 3.0 1,258.1 7.1 88.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
-97.9 -99.8 inf -3.9 inf inf -100.0 0.0 -100.0
China HPAI
0.9 56.3 42.1 26.4 12,859.6 180.5 393.7 0.0 0.0
-89.7 -57.4 inf 436.2 0.3 inf -25.8 0.0 0.0
Russia HPAI
18.0 352.0 148.6 179.2 71.5 640.9 1,018.1 0.0 0.0
-76.8 -23.9 43.0 11.1 781.2 47.9 -13.3 0.0 0.0
USA LPAI
32.9 34.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12,826.7 0.1 497.0
inf inf 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -7.9
Japan LPAI
41.8 740.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 117.5 679.3 8.0
inf 12.0 -100.0 -100.0 -100.0 0.0 49.6 -9.9 0.0
ROW LPAI
130.2 129.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 256.2 314.3 21,818.5
inf inf -100.0 0.0 -100.0 -100.0 inf 45.1 1.0
Note: Per cent change to baseline in italic below each mean trade value. inf characterizes positive changes 
(>1000%) starting from a mean value close or equal to zero. 
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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Table 19 Mean trade flows (1000 t) and changes in per cent compared to 
baseline situation for cooked meat
Realistic scenario
Exporter
Netherlands Brazil Germany France China Russia USA Japan ROW
Importer AI status FAI FAI HPAI HPAI HPAI HPAI LPAI LPAI LPAI
Netherlands FAI
9.2 33.9 0.0 5.5 0.3 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0
-16.6 1.4 0.0 2.4 inf 0.0 inf 0.0 0.0
Brazil FAI
0.0 254.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2
0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 840.6 0.0 888.7 0.0 inf
Germany HPAI
31.9 69.5 127.6 20.8 0.5 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0
-8.4 1.5 -1.0 4.2 inf 0.0 inf 0.0 0.0
France HPAI
0.0 1.5 0.0 196.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3
0.0 -48.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 inf
China HPAI
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 188.0 0.0 4.1 0.0 79.8
0.0 0.0 0.0 172.7 0.7 0.0 -12.4 0.0 -2.3
Russia HPAI
0.0 6.8 0.0 7.9 0.3 59.4 3.9 0.0 0.0
-91.4 9.5 -92.2 6.0 inf -2.5 13.1 0.0 0.0
USA LPAI
0.0 0.0 0.0 12.1 0.0 0.0 inf 0.0 13.1
0.0 0.0 0.0 -10.6 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -15.4
Japan LPAI
0.0 34.7 0.0 1.3 166.9 0.0 10.6 183.5 0.0
0.0 3.0 -76.3 249.3 0.0 -13.6 8.0 -1.5 0.0
ROW LPAI
36.9 0.0 95.1 0.0 0.0 7.5 0.0 124.0 8,935.8
17.0 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 44.3 0.0 1.7 0.2
Drastic scenario
Exporter
Netherlands Brazil Germany France China Russia USA Japan ROW
Importer AI status FAI FAI HPAI HPAI HPAI HPAI LPAI LPAI LPAI
Netherlands FAI
7.0 42.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
-36.2 27.6 0.0 -100.0 -100.0 0.0 -100.0 0.0 0.0
Brazil FAI
0.0 254.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 -100.0 0.0 -100.0 0.0 -100.0
Germany HPAI
0.0 0.0 115.5 42.7 89.5 12.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
-100.0 -100.0 -10.4 114.2 inf inf -100.0 0.0 0.0
France HPAI
0.0 0.0 34.4 152.0 0.0 18.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 -100.0 0.0 -22.5 0.0 inf 0.0 0.0 -100.0
China HPAI
0.0 0.0 35.4 29.5 201.3 15.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 inf 7.9 inf -100.0 0.0 -100.0
Russia HPAI
0.0 0.0 20.9 3.9 39.8 16.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
-100.0 -100.0 13,159.8 -47.6 inf -72.9 -100.0 0.0 0.0
USA LPAI
0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 inf 0.0 25.8
0.0 0.0 0.0 -100.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 66.4
Japan LPAI
4.3 105.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 40.7 202.6 42.6
0.0 212.1 -100.0 -100.0 -100.0 -100.0 315.7 8.8 0.0
ROW LPAI
66.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 107.4 8,995.6
112.1 0.0 -100.0 0.0 0.0 -100.0 0.0 -11.9 0.8
Note: Per cent change to baseline in italic below each mean trade value. inf characterizes positive changes 
(>1000%) starting from a mean value close or equal to zero.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
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Export-oriented FAI countries cannot benefit from the AI risk reduction due to an 
import ban as their imports of uncooked meat from infected countries are 
negligible whereas their exports into LPAI and HPAI markets now compete with 
ban-displaced products. The Netherlands suffer losses as increased domestic sales 
in Germany and Russia at lower marginal production costs replace their imports so 
that they have to export to new destinations (ROW) at lower prices. A similar 
situation occurs for Brazil, where larger exports to Japan and ROW cannot 
compensate for the losses in the German, French, and Russian export market. 
Overall, in both countries, production of uncooked meat decreases and cannot be 
offset by low, but, positive developments in the production and export of cooked 
meat.
Contrary to producers in FAI countries, producers in LPAI countries benefit in 
this scenario (except for ROW). These gains mostly result from changes in 
producer rent. The export-oriented US can slightly increase its overall exports of 
uncooked meat (mainly to Japan and ROW) whereas for the more importer-
oriented Japan (and ROW) this increase in agricultural profits results mostly from a 
slight increase in production in conjunction with higher domestic prices. 
ROW is a net importer for both types of meat where uncooked meat is more 
important. Due to the assumption that ROW is a LPAI country, it loses all imports 
of uncooked meat from Russia, China and Germany, representing 80% of its 
baseline imports and 4.5% of its baseline demand. The imports are partially 
replaced by increased imports from HPAI free countries and domestic sales as 
marginal production costs increase both domestically and in the non-HPAI 
countries. The increase in profits cannot offset the loss of consumer welfare due to 
the higher prices.
The higher domestic prices for both types of meat in Japan and ROW lead to a 
negative effect on consumer welfare which subsequently explains the overall 
negative welfare effect for ROW. Consumers in all other countries benefit from 
lower domestic prices for the more important commodity of uncooked meat as the 
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bans together with the trade diversion effects imply higher supply on domestic 
markets and thus decreased domestic prices.34
In the drastic scenario we observe somewhat stronger welfare changes where 
the direction and disaggregated effects for agricultural producers and consumers 
are comparable to the realistic scenario. The difference is that FAI countries also 
ban uncooked meat originating from LPAI countries and that cooked meat 
produced in HPAI countries is globally banned by countries with a lower risk 
status. In the results the effect of cooked meat is reflected in the fact that now 
HPAI countries also record losses in the production of this type of meat and that 
they start to trade this type of meat more intensively among each other. Given the 
already described effect of increased domestic supply when a ban is introduced, 
also this additional ban of uncooked LPAI meat hurts FAI countries, as their
exports are again displaced from these markets. Thus, in the drastic scenario, 
overall, the FAI countries Brazil and the Netherlands decrease exports instead of 
being able to capture new export markets. 
34 The reader is however reminded that our findings are based on the assumption that consumers’ 
utility is not affected directly by the perceived protection delivered by a ban.
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5.3 Conclusion of the chapter
Using two approaches, this case study analyzes the impact of avian influenza-
related regulatory measures on worldwide trade of cooked and uncooked poultry 
meat. A Heckman-type gravity model is estimated to analyze the trade impact of 
three AI-related policies. Second, a spatial multi-commodity simulation model is 
specified to account for the welfare effects of two of these policies. Results of the 
econometric model show differences in the trade impact of the policy measures for 
uncooked and cooked meat. For uncooked meat a ban has a nearly prohibitive trade 
impact whereas the regionalization variable is trade enhancing. For cooked meat, 
the results are inconclusive, which might be related to substantial shift effects from 
uncooked to cooked meat when bans are imposed. The simulation model highlights 
that important trade diversion effects among countries take place which depend 
very much on the infection status of the involved countries. The outcomes of the 
realistic and the drastic scenario differ in the intensity of their implication: The 
drastic scenario generally leads to higher welfare losses. A major effect, found in 
other studies as well but perhaps still astonishing is that banned exporting countries 
redirect much of their original exports towards their own market. The banned 
countries start to trade among each other, crowding out imports from countries 
which are not directly targeted by the ban.
In this study, disease transmission is modeled via the import of infected poultry 
meat. This is in line with the guidelines and assumptions made by the OIE, but 
there is scientific evidence that the risk potentially resulting from imports of 
uncooked meat might be negligible (Zepeda and Salman 2007, Pharo 2003). In 
addition, it has to be remembered that most transmission into foreign territory
occurs through the migration of wild birds. Subsequent damage then happens 
through the infiltration of the virus into poultry flocks or because of the preventive 
slaughtering of neighboring poultry herds. Thus, the infection risk-related supply 
side effects assumed in this study are likely to be smaller and may eventually be 
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replaced by fixed costs that are dependent on the number of outbreaks assumed to 
occur within a territory. 
Given the scientific evidence and the country results of the welfare analysis of 
the simulation model, it is even more questionable than at the starting point of this 
study if a trade ban is the most appropriate measure to address the infection risk 
resulting from the spread of the avian influenza virus.
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6 Conclusions of the thesis
The doctoral thesis ‘Impact of regulatory measures on international trade in meat 
products’ discussed the effects of various regulatory measures on international
meat trade and on welfare. It surely clarified that different regulatory measures, and 
especially those related to the protection of agri-food production from biohazards, 
impact trade and welfare of countries and involved stakeholders in considerably
differing levels. The analysis was carried out in two case studies, developing two 
different gravity models and a spatial partial equilibrium model. The most 
important findings shall be summarized in the following.
6.1 Summary of results 
The thesis started with setting regulatory measures into the legal context of the 
multilateral trade regime and into the economic context of associated benefits and 
costs. The WTO as well as the multilateral SPS and TBT Agreements were 
identified to set the boundaries for a justifiable and reasonable implementation of 
regulatory measures within the multilateral trade regime. This system of rules aims
at ensuring that regulations are not misused as disguised protectionist measures. It 
demands that national regulations are based on international rules developed by 
international standard setting organizations. However, the mulilateral trade regime 
foresees the possibility of divergent rules for imported food products if they impact 
human, animal and/or plant health and life in the importing country negatively.
These divergent rules apply only to regulations which are directly product-related, 
or which govern production processes that are directly product-related, i.e. the 
choice of the production method physically impacts the final product. In order to 
impose different and possibly tighter regulatory measures on imported products, 
importing countries are required to provide a scientific risk assessment procedure, 
substantiating the threat associated with the product, and thereby justifying the 
necessity of the respective divergent requirements. Additionally, regulations have 
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to be commensurate with regard to their objective and have to be least trade 
restrictive in terms of achieving their objective. Analyzing the economic context of 
regulatory measures, it was elaborated that they cause costs as well as benefits and 
therefore can shift supply and demand curves. Thus, they may impact trade flows 
between countries as well as domestic and foreign countries’ producers’ and 
consumers’ welfare negatively or positively. Assessing the trade and welfare 
impact is first and foremost an empirical issue.
Chapter 2 discussed theory and quantitative methods available to determine the 
impact of regulatory measures on trade and gave first reasons for the choice of the 
econometric approaches used in the two case studies. It was elaborated that 
different trade theories can be used to justify the appearance and the results of the 
gravity equation theoretically. The gravity model can be derived from Heckscher-
Ohlin and Ricardian trade theories, as well as from monopolistic competition 
models and Armington-like specifications. Additionally, various econometric 
approaches for estimating impacts of border barriers were presented in chapter 2, 
and their merits and disadvantages were discussed. Traditionally, gravity models 
are specified in a straightforward log-normal equation that is estimated by ordinary 
least squares (OLS). However, there are considerable problems associated with this 
specification and its estimation, as depending on the structure of the data the 
estimates might be biased and inefficient. First, trade is determined by relative 
trade barriers like multilateral resistance; omitting these may cause country-pair 
heterogeneity and biased estimates. Second, sample selection bias may result from 
the need to drop missing trade relationships which are quite common on a 
disaggregated product level. Third, the intensive and extensive margin of the trade 
impact of trade frictions has to be taken into account. And fourth, the questionable 
assumption of homoscedasticity underlying the log-linear model is a matter of 
concern. Possible solutions to overcome some or all of these challenges are non-
linear regression models, fixed or random effects models, Tobit models, sample 
selection models, and different Poisson-type models. Overall, there is no unifying
econometric method and the different approaches presented to overcome the 
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discussed econometric challenges have all their advantages and disadvantages in 
terms of practicability, coverage and ability to capture certain features of regulatory 
measures.
Chapter 3 presented the first case study of this thesis. It analyzed the impact of 
different regulatory policy measures on meat trade with the aim to identify least 
trade-distorting sanitary regulations. Meat products were chosen because trade in 
meat is exposed to a wide number of market failures which motivates policy 
makers to implement regulatory instruments that may also serve protectionist 
purposes. A data base was developed which comprises manually collected 
regulations which were available in existing data bases of the WTO and the 
International Portal on Food Safety, Animal and Plant Health. The dataset used was
specifically compiled for this study. It is new and unique with respect to the detail 
of information on the applied sector specific national regulatory instruments and 
with respect to the applied classification of measures into SPS areas and political 
objectives these measures serve. Altogether, over 4000 regulatory measures could 
be identified in the sample that were imposed on meat trade. These measures were 
grouped according to different classes, instruments and policy objectives. A non-
linear panel data gravity model with fixed effects was estimated by Poisson 
pseudo-maximum likelihood to identify the measures’ or rather the aggregation 
groups’ trade impact. The outcome displayed the already mentioned ambiguous 
effect of many of these measures: At the class level, regulations differed in their 
implied trade impact. The even further disaggregated estimation at the level of the 
single regulation showed that there are specific measures which have a substantial 
positive and others which have a significant negative impact. These effects can 
offset each other within a class. When grouping the regulations according to 
underlying policy goals, policy measures ensuring animal health were identified as 
being significantly trade-enhancing.
Chapter 4 summarized the literature relevant for analyzing the welfare impact of 
sanitary regulations and set up the methodological approaches being used in the 
simulation part of the second case study. The chapter justified the application of a 
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Takayama-Judge-type model instead of an Armington-type model. Furthermore,
the chapter discussed how to incorporate benefits and costs of regulatory measures 
into the demand and supply functions of a partial equilibrium model. It was 
elaborated that the introduction of policy measures regulating the threat associated 
with biohazards into the simulation model may impact the supply and demand 
functions considerably.
In chapter 5 the second case study of this thesis was presented. It analyzed the 
impact of AI-related policy measures on poultry meat trade and welfare. Avian 
influenza was identified as an important area of political concern when analyzing 
the trade concerns on poultry raised in the SPS Committee of the WTO. Within the 
case study, in a first step past AI-related policies were evaluated in terms of their 
trade impact using a Heckman-type sample selection gravity approach being 
extended according to Helpman et al. (2008) and additionally modified by 
introducing a SUR system. On the basis of a sample of six major poultry meat 
exporters and two importers as well an ROW aggregate, the policy option ban was
identified to restrict trade considerably at least for uncooked meat, whereas a ban 
which is modified by complying with the principle of regionalization had a positive 
trade impact. In a second step, a spatial Takayama-Judge-type partial equilibrium 
model was used to simulate welfare changes due to the implementation of different 
AI-related policy options. Disease transmission was modeled via the import of 
infected poultry meat, following a so-called risk-based approach. The results of the 
simulation model show that important trade diversion effects among countries take 
place which depend very much on the infection status of the involved countries. 
Given scientific evidence and the results of the analysis in this second case study, it 
is even more questionable than at the starting point of this study whether a trade 
ban is the most appropriate measure to address the infection risk resulting from the 
spread and transmission of avian influenza.
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6.2 Limitations and suggestions for further research
This thesis has provided insights into the impact of regulatory policy measures on 
meat trade and welfare and results can be used by policy makers and regulators. 
Though considerable effort has been made to capture the complexity of the 
research questions, the chosen methods still go along with some limitations. These 
are pointed out in the following, and suggestions for further research are made.
As possibly any empirical work, this thesis is subject to limitations in the 
existence and quality of data. This is especially the case for data on regulatory 
measures. Existing data bases containing information of various types of NTMs are 
not comprehensive enough to execute a case study on a detailed product-specific 
level, as it was done in both case studies in this thesis. The manual search of 
regulations in the first case study improved the data situation considerably, but 
cannot claim to be all-embracing. Furthermore, it is not always clear, whether a 
regulation, once implemented, is not phased out after some time. Therefore, an 
assumption had to be made about the average duration of effectiveness of the 
disease-related measures in the first case study. In the second case study this was 
not a concern as time-specific data was available, i.e. starting as well as ending 
points were given. Improving the quality of data availability was one big aim of the
Framework Programme 7 NTM-Impact project sponsored by the European 
Commission, which supported the development of the second case study 
financially. However, even in a project with relatively many resources it proved to 
be difficult to encompass the different types, the scope, and the way of 
implementation of existing regulatory measures for more than a few products. 
Further research should measure the stringency of regulations instead just count the 
number of existing ones. In this regard the concept of policy heterogeneity which 
generates an index comparing regulations across countries on an identical scale 
seems to be a promising tool. This concept is pursued in an aggregate analysis as 
one part of the NTM-Impact project (cf. Rau et al. 2010).
The availability of data on production, consumption and on domestic as well as 
foreign prices for a highly disaggregated product level was also limited. The data 
Conclusions of the thesis
104
calibration process partly changed the original values considerably as a 
compromise had to be made between given values, consistency with the assumed 
economic behaviour and achieving a technical solution. Moreover, empirically 
estimated elasticities were not available for the same level of product 
disaggregation. Additionally, scientific data on infected stocks and disease 
transmission rates were partly missing making it necessary to assume values based 
on reasonable arguments. Improving the data quality, and estimating the full set of 
elasticities econometrically would possibly augment the quality of the simulation
model’s outcome.
An improvement of the partial equilibrium model could be to also let the 
demand function react to a disease outbreak. Though it is reasonable that in case of 
avian influenza medium term changes in consumer response are negligible, in other 
cases this is not the case as it could be seen in demand of beef after the outbreak of 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy that shrunk considerably even in the long run.
6.3 Concluding remarks
The thesis has advanced existing literature in quantitatively and systematically 
comparing the trade and welfare impacts of a multitude of relevant regulatory 
measures shaping the global meat trade system. So far research just focused on one 
or few regulations or on an index of an overall regulatory measure. Identifying the 
best regulatory measure in each regulatory situation is still comprehensive and 
depends on the precise economic and regulatory or sanitary environment. Further 
improvements of data quality on regulatory measures exceeding the advancements
realized by the NTM-Impact project and a multitude of different case studies along 
with an intensified interaction between natural sciences and economic modeling 
will surely help to achieve the final aim to derive rules making it easier to identify 
the best regulatory measure in each regulatory situation.
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Appendix
Table A1 Market balances for uncooked and cooked poultry meat
Supply
Domestic 
sales Imports Demand Exports
Poultry meat [1000 t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [1000 t] [1000 t]
Uncooked Germany 696.62 472.77 534.21 1,006.98 223.85
Netherlands 599.59 145.08 74.42 219.50 454.51
France 1,587.36 1,309.04 45.58 1,354.62 278.32
USA 14,623.27 12,839.34 540.86 13,380.20 1,783.93
Brazil 7,035.28 5,601.23 0.01 5,601.25 1,434.05
Japan 970.34 753.70 833.60 1,587.30 216.64
China 13,132.26 12,827.40 678.45 13,505.85 304.86
Russia 1,112.89 433.21 1,987.12 2,420.33 679.68
Rest of the World 22,137.82 21,598.07 1,221.34 22,819.41 539.75
Cooked Germany 221.17 128.94 123.19 252.13 92.23
Netherlands 77.73 11.04 38.84 49.87 66.70
France 242.92 196.06 2.82 198.88 46.86
USA 2,253.87 2,236.01 29.06 2,265.06 17.86
Brazil 399.33 254.68 0.00 254.68 144.65
Japan 308.16 186.19 210.89 397.08 121.97
China 353.59 186.66 86.43 273.09 166.94
Russia 66.17 60.95 17.66 78.61 5.22
Rest of the World 9,019.29 8,922.12 250.70 9,172.82 97.17
Note: Simulation model baseline (based on UNCTAD 2011a).
Source: Authors’ calculation.
